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# Report of the Secretary-General on possible options to further the aim of prosecuting and imprisoning persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, including, in particular, options for creating special domestic chambers possibly with international components, a regional tribunal or an international tribunal and corresponding imprisonment arrangements, taking into account the work of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, the existing practice in establishing international and mixed tribunals, and the time and resources necessary to achieve and sustain substantive results

*Summary*

The Security Council, in its resolution 1918 (2010) of 27 April 2010, requested the Secretary-General to present a report on possible options to further the aim of prosecuting and imprisoning persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, including, in particular, options for creating special domestic chambers possibly with international components, a regional tribunal or an international tribunal and corresponding imprisonment arrangements, taking into account the work of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, the existing practice in establishing international and mixed tribunals, and the time and resources necessary to achieve and sustain substantive results.

In response, the Secretary-General has identified seven options for the Security Council to consider:

Option 1: The enhancement of United Nations assistance to build capacity of regional States to prosecute and imprison persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia

Option 2: The establishment of a Somali court sitting in the territory of a third State in the region, either with or without United Nations participation

Option 3: The establishment of a special chamber within the national jurisdiction of a State or States in the region, without United Nations participation

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Option 4: The establishment of a special chamber within the national jurisdiction of a State or States in the region, with United Nations participation

Option 5: The establishment of a regional tribunal on the basis of a multilateral agreement among regional States, with United Nations participation

Option 6: The establishment of an international tribunal on the basis of an agreement between a State in the region and the United Nations

Option 7: The establishment of an international tribunal by Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations

Option 1 is already ongoing and has achieved some success. In particular, Kenya opened a new high security courtroom on 24 June 2010 in Shimo La Tewa, Mombasa, which was built by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Counter-Piracy Programme. This courtroom will be used to hear piracy cases and to try other serious criminal offences. The Security Council may wish to consider continuing, and building on, the role it has played in its resolutions to enhance option 1. A potential host State would need to be identified for each of the other options. It would be necessary to ascertain the preferences of that potential host State, including whether it would accept international participation in such mechanism, and, if so, in what form. The advantages and disadvantages of the options are therefore analysed in the light of general considerations that apply.

The need for sufficient arrangements for imprisonment in the region, ideally in Somalia, may be as critical as the options for prosecution. This is particularly so given the large numbers of suspects apprehended by naval States. The need for such imprisonment arrangements to be developed is likely to be a significant factor in any process to seek to identify a potential host State for a new judicial mechanism.

The Security Council request emphasizes the important goal of achieving and sustaining substantive results. A key consideration in this respect would be the need for sufficient political and financial commitment among States, in difficult economic times, not only to establish a new judicial mechanism, but also to sustain it. A new judicial mechanism to address piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia would be addressing a different situation to that addressed by the existing United Nations and United Nations-assisted tribunals. Such a mechanism would face ongoing criminal activity and potentially a large caseload, with no predictable completion date.

**Option 1: The enhancement of United Nations assistance to build capacity of regional States to prosecute and imprison persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia**

This option involves consolidating and building on the successes already achieved, such as the opening of the new high security courtroom in Shimo La Tewa, Mombasa, to hear piracy cases and to try other serious criminal offences. The enhancement of the capacity of regional States would involve both sustaining and increasing the capacity of those States already conducting prosecutions, and encouraging further regional States to accept the transfer of suspects for prosecution. This would require political engagement with regional States, including potentially through the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, and sustained funding for United Nations programmes, including through the International Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States Countering Piracy. It is also likely to require

arrangements to be in place for the imprisonment in third States of those convicted, and the repatriation of those not convicted. Improving the standards of prisons in Somalia, in particular in the regions of Puntland and Somaliland, is likely to be key to making progress. Sufficient funding for assistance programmes in Somalia will be essential to developing the long-term solution of prosecution and imprisonment by Somalia. The Security Council may wish to consider continuing, and building on, the role it has played in its resolutions to enhance option 1.

**Option 2: The establishment of a Somali court sitting in the territory of a third State in the region, either with or without participation by the United Nations**

The purpose of this option would be to provide a secure environment in which a Somali court could conduct prosecutions. This would require an agreement between Somalia and the host State, and, if established with United Nations participation, would also require an agreement with the United Nations. Although the special court would be within Somalia's national jurisdiction, the legislative and criminal procedural framework necessary for conducting piracy prosecutions is currently fragmented, and substantial assistance would be needed to enable prosecutions to be conducted to international standards. Identifying a regional State willing and able to provide the facilities for hosting a Somali court may present challenges. Assistance to the Somali court under this option would not benefit the host State's criminal justice system. Advantages may include enabling Somalia to play a role in the solution to the problem of piracy; and capacity-building of the Somali judicial system, thereby contributing to strengthening the rule of law in Somalia. Disadvantages may include the time necessary for its establishment; and higher costs than those for option 3, given the substantial assistance likely to be necessary. Discussions in Working Group 2 on legal issues of the Contact Group have raised issues concerning the adequacy of Somalia's piracy laws and the capacity of Somalia's judicial system. These issues may need to be addressed in order for this option to be feasible. The advantages of this option would also need to be weighed against the advantages of assisting Somali courts to prosecute within Somalia, if feasible.

**Option 3: The establishment of a special chamber within the national jurisdiction of a State or States in the region, without United Nations participation**

The first consideration under this option is whether the State concerned is conducting or could potentially conduct a sufficient number of piracy prosecutions to justify a special chamber dedicated to such prosecutions. Somalia may be the one State at present where, in the regions of Puntland and Somaliland, there may be a sufficient volume of prosecutions to justify a special chamber. At present, however, there appears to be insufficient donor confidence in the standards of these prosecutions to fund United Nations assistance programmes at the same levels as in other regional States. A special chamber in a State in the region would have the advantages of being part of an existing jurisdiction with established crimes and procedures; cost-effectiveness; and proximity for the purpose of transfer of suspects by patrolling naval States, and the transfer of those convicted to third States for imprisonment. Possible disadvantages may include drawing resources from the State's criminal justice system more broadly; "two-tier" justice; and limited capacity.

**Option 4: The establishment of a special chamber within the national jurisdiction of a State or States in the region, with United Nations participation**

Participation by United Nations selected judges, prosecutors and/or staff in such a chamber would require an agreement between the State concerned and the United Nations. As with option 3 above, the first consideration would be whether there are or could potentially be sufficient piracy prosecutions in that State to justify a special chamber dedicated to such prosecutions. The advantages of this option may include being part of an existing jurisdiction with established crimes and procedures; capacity-building for the host State, and possibly other regional States; proximity for the purpose of the transfer of suspects by patrolling naval States, and the transfer of those convicted to third States for imprisonment. Although this option would be relatively cost-effective, it would be likely to be more expensive than option 3. If the host State were Kenya or Seychelles, this option would benefit from their expertise. The disadvantages may include drawing resources from the State's criminal justice system more broadly; and limited capacity. Participation by United Nations judges in the regional States that are conducting piracy trials, or are considering doing so, might in many cases necessitate changes to criminal procedures because these regional States currently have single judge trials.

**Option 5: The establishment of a regional tribunal on the basis of a multilateral agreement among regional States, with United Nations participation**

This option would require a multilateral treaty to be negotiated among regional States, ideally including Somalia. Participation by United Nations judges, prosecutors and/or staff would require an agreement with the United Nations. The practice of United Nations selected judges being in the majority in chambers in which they sit would need to be assessed in the context of a regional tribunal comprising regional judges. Advantages of this option may include capacity-building for the participating regional States; proximity for the purpose of the transfer of suspects by patrolling naval States, and the transfer of those convicted to third States for imprisonment; and possibly greater capacity than a special chamber within a national jurisdiction. Disadvantages may include the need to establish the jurisdiction of a new tribunal, including the crimes and procedures; the time necessary to establish the tribunal; and, likely, higher costs than a special chamber within a national jurisdiction. A risk might be that such a regional tribunal may draw expertise and resources from the jurisdictions of regional States conducting prosecutions.

**Option 6: The establishment of an international tribunal on the basis of an agreement between a State in the region and the United Nations**

This option would require an agreement between the United Nations and the State concerned to establish an international tribunal with both United Nations and national components. The practice has been to establish such tribunals with United Nations selected judges in the majority. For the reasons set out in connection with option 3, there may be challenges associated with the establishment of a tribunal with Somalia at present. Whether to seek to establish such a tribunal with any other regional State, rather than pursuing options 3 or 4, would require careful assessment. If the host State were Kenya or Seychelles, the tribunal would benefit from their growing expertise, but may also draw such expertise and resources from prosecutions

within their national jurisdiction. Advantages of this option may include capacity-building for the host State, although probably less so than option 4; and proximity for the purpose of the transfer of suspects by patrolling naval States, and the transfer of those convicted to third States for imprisonment. Disadvantages may include the need to establish the jurisdiction of a new tribunal, including the crimes and procedures; the time necessary to establish the tribunal; and, likely, higher costs than a special chamber within the State's national jurisdiction.

**Option 7: The establishment of an international tribunal by Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations**

An international tribunal established by Security Council resolution under Chapter VII would comprise entirely United Nations selected judges, prosecutors and staff, and might or might not be located in the region. Inclusion of United Nations selected judges from the region, including Somalia, would promote regional capacity-building. If judges, prosecutors and/or staff were drawn from Kenya or Seychelles, the tribunal would benefit from their experience, but their inclusion may risk inhibiting those States' capacity to prosecute nationally. Although the time necessary for the Council to negotiate the necessary Chapter VII resolution may be relatively short, an assessment of the overall time required in connection with this option would include the time required to identify and negotiate with a potential host State. The advantages of this option may include greater capacity than a special chamber within a national jurisdiction; and the Council's ability to require the cooperation of third States with the tribunal through its resolution under Chapter VII. Disadvantages may include higher costs; and, if not located in the region, lack of proximity for the purpose of the transfer of suspects by patrolling naval States, and the transfer of those convicted to third States, if imprisonment is to take place in the region.

**Further options raised by members of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia**

Some members of the Contact Group also raised the options of amending the statutes of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. Possible amendment of the Rome Statute of the ICC was not taken up by the States parties at the first review conference, which took place in June 2010 in Kampala. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights are courts that determine inter-State disputes and have no criminal jurisdiction. Amendment of their statutes was therefore considered not to be an option.

**The role of Somalia**

Whichever of the options, if any, may be favoured by the Security Council, the longer-term need to assist Somalia and its regions to develop the capacity to prosecute and imprison to international standards will be key in sustaining results in the fight against impunity for those responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia.

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# I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1918 (2010) of 27 April 2010. The Security Council requested the Secretary-General to present a report on possible options to further the aim of prosecuting and imprisoning persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, including, in particular, options for creating special domestic chambers possibly with international components, a regional tribunal or an international tribunal and corresponding imprisonment arrangements, taking into account the work of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, the existing practice in establishing international and mixed tribunals, and the time and resources necessary to achieve and sustain substantive results.

2. This report describes, in section II, the nature and extent of the problem of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia and its causes. Section III sets out the applicable law. Section IV describes the current United Nations approach to assisting States to prosecute and imprison persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea within their national jurisdictions. Section V analyses various options for furthering the aim of prosecuting and imprisoning persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia. Section VI provides a conclusion. The annexes to the report contain detailed information on the existing practice of the United Nations in establishing and participating in United Nations and United Nations-assisted tribunals (annex I), and on relevant discussions in the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (annex II).

3. In this report, the term "United Nations participation" is used to refer to the participation by judges, prosecutors and/or staff selected by the United Nations in a judicial mechanism. It is to be distinguished from "United Nations assistance", which refers to technical assistance by the United Nations to assist a State or judicial mechanism to build its capacity. The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) are referred to as "United Nations tribunals" because they are subsidiary organs of the Security Council and therefore form part of the United Nations Organization. Tribunals that do not form part of the United Nations Organization, but are established on the basis of an agreement between the United Nations and the State concerned, are referred to as "United Nations-assisted tribunals". These United Nations-assisted tribunals are sometimes also referred to as "hybrid" or "mixed" tribunals, as in the above request of the Security Council, owing to their mix of international and national components.

# II. Nature and extent of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia

## A. The situation in Somalia

4. Acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia are a symptom of the instability and lack of rule of law in Somalia. The lack of effective governance has persisted since the overthrow of the government of Siad Barre on 31 January 1991. This situation has had a profound negative impact on the

population, which has not enjoyed the benefits of the rule of law for two decades. The Transitional Federal Government of Somalia is attempting to establish its governance structures and the rule of law, including through the development of the security and justice sectors. However, in most of south-central Somalia, militia groups are still in control, limiting the capacity to establish law and order. Pirate attacks are severely constraining the importation of goods into the country. The prices of food have risen, and investment in the local economy has been affected as building materials and other raw materials have become less available. Unemployment is widespread. These conditions have led many young Somalis to join armed groups and militias, or to be drawn into criminal activity, including piracy.

5. Insecurity in south-central Somalia has made it almost impossible for the judicial system to function. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in cooperation with the Transitional Federal Government Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court, is identifying immediate, short- and long-term needs in the justice system, including the appointment of judges, and providing training for judicial staff. Over the past two years, the United Nations, UNDP, the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM), the Transitional Federal Government and other partners have been working on strengthening the police and security forces. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and UNDP are working to improve prison standards in the Puntland and Somaliland regions of Somalia.

6. A sustainable response to the situation in Somalia, and therefore to piracy and armed robbery at sea, requires the establishment of effective governance, the rule of law, credible security sector institutions, and alternative livelihoods for the Somali people. This requires the Transitional Federal Government and the regional authorities to lead in the prioritization and coordination of efforts. For this purpose, in January 2010, the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), the Department of Political Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) assisted in the establishment of the Somali Counter-Piracy Technical Coordination Mechanism in Kampala, also referred to as the Kampala process.[1] The Kampala process comprises technical representatives from the Transitional Federal Government, and the regions of Puntland and Somaliland, as well as representatives from relevant United Nations offices, and is intended to improve the flow of information between the Somali central and regional authorities and their cooperation with the international community on counter-piracy initiatives. It seeks to establish a consolidated approach among the authorities through sharing information and coordinating activities in the areas of legislative review, prisons, fisheries and maritime safety and security.

[1] See the communique of the fifth plenary meeting of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (28 January 2010), which refers to the Contact Group welcoming the agreement that led to the creation of the mechanism (available at www.norway-un.org/News/Latest_news/COMMUNIQUE-Contact-Group-on-Piracy-off-the-Coast-of-Somalia).

## B. Incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia and the naval operations

7. Piracy attacks around the world have continued to escalate in recent years, owing almost entirely to rising incidents of piracy off the coast of Somalia. The number of attacks off the coast of Somalia has steadily increased since 1991, and over the past two years has increased from 111 vessels attacked in 2008 to 217 vessels attacked in 2009.[2] Bearing in mind that each incident involves a number of individuals, it is clear that there are large numbers of persons involved. There were 30 attacks during the first quarter of 2010.[3] According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the pirates operate from around 70 camps on beaches on the Somali coast, which is approximately 1,800 miles long. Their methods have become increasingly sophisticated, indicating greater planning, financing and organization. To reach far out to sea, they make use of larger vessels that have been captured as "mother ships" to tow smaller and faster boats close to the point of attack. The mother ships are often loaded with fuel, water and food. Pirates often now have Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) equipment and heavier weapons, including rocket-propelled grenades.

8. While the number of attacks remains high, increased naval patrols off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Aden have effectively reduced the success rate of these attacks. In 2007, 63 per cent of attacks were successful; in 2008, 34 per cent were successful; in 2009, 21 per cent were successful; and the figure for 2010 is likely to be below 20 per cent.[2] The decrease in success is attributable to the additional defensive measures put in place by merchant ships, their more cautious navigational routes, and effective naval operations. Nevertheless, as at 15 May 2010, some 450 mariners were being held hostage on vessels captured by pirates off the coast of Somalia. The involvement of naval vessels from more than 30 States represents one of the largest peacetime naval operations ever. Many States take part in one of three naval operations in the region: the European Union naval operation Atalanta (directed from Northwood, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (also directed from Northwood) and the Coalition Maritime Forces (directed from Bahrain). In addition, many States have sent naval vessels to the region under national command.

9. Although the number of patrolling naval States involved is high, the number of ships on patrol off the coast of Somalia at any one time may be no more than 10. This is because they need to refuel and replenish their supplies, and the distance to their home State is often great. Given the vast area of ocean affected, maritime patrol aircraft play an important role in identifying pirates, directing naval ships to interdict, and advising merchant ships to alter course. These aircraft are based in Seychelles, Kenya and Djibouti. In order to be effective, naval operations apprehending suspects should result in prosecutions. The risk otherwise is that suspects are released at sea, or repatriated, and return to commit further acts of piracy or armed robbery at sea.

[2] Statistics provided at the Seychelles Regional Conference on Piracy, held in May 2010.

[3] See ICC International Maritime Bureau, "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, report for the period 1 January-31 March 2010" (available at www.icc-ccs.org).

# III. Applicable law

10. The international legal regime applicable to piracy consists of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,[4] other international and regional instruments, relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, and national implementing legislation.

## A. International and regional instruments

11. The international legal regime applicable to piracy is set out primarily in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which codifies customary international law.[5] In accordance with article 100 of the Convention, the primary obligation for all States is to cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy.[6] The definition of piracy is contained in article 101 of the Convention.[7] It includes any illegal acts of violence, detention or depredation committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship against another ship, or persons or property on board that ship. In order to constitute acts of piracy, such acts have to be committed on the high seas, outside the jurisdiction of any State, or within the exclusive economic zone of any State.[8] The definition also includes any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating any of the aforementioned acts.[9] Some acts of piracy may also constitute offences under other international legal instruments, such as the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention),[10] the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages[11] and the 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.[12]

12. There is universal jurisdiction over acts of piracy on the high seas and in the exclusive economic zones of States.[13] This means that any State may seize a pirate ship on the high seas or in the exclusive economic zone of any State, arrest the persons on board, and prosecute them.[14] Universal jurisdiction is "permissive",

[4] The 1958 Convention on the High Seas contains provisions relating to piracy very similar to those of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

[5] The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was adopted by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and opened for signature on 10 December 1982 (available at www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm).

[6] See International Law Commission, *Articles Concerning the Law of the Sea with Commentaries*, 1956 (II) *Yearbook of the International Law Commission*, art. 38; the International Law Commission observed in its commentary that "[a]ny State having an opportunity of taking measures against piracy, and neglecting to do so, would be failing in a duty laid upon it by international law. Obviously, the State must be allowed a certain latitude as to the measures it should take to this end in any individual case".

[7] See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 101, for its definition of piracy (available at www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm).

[8] See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 58, para. 2.

[9] See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 101, paras. (b) and (c). The definition does not refer to attempts to commit acts of piracy, or to conspiracy relating to acts of piracy.

[10] Adopted by the International Maritime Organization at Rome on 10 March 1988; some States have taken the view that the SUA Convention was intended to apply to acts of terrorism only.

[11] See General Assembly resolution 34/146.

[12] See General Assembly resolution 55/25.

[13] See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 105.

[14] See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 58, para. 2, and art. 105.

which means that States are entitled to exercise jurisdiction, but are not obliged to do so. Acts when committed within the territorial sea of a State, which would be piracy if committed on the high seas, are referred to as "armed robbery at sea" or "armed robbery against ships".[15] The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea does not contain any provisions on armed robbery at sea, and universal jurisdiction does not apply to these acts. The coastal State has jurisdiction over such acts committed in its territorial sea.[16]

13. At the regional level, the Djibouti Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (Djibouti Code of Conduct) is a non-binding instrument primarily for cooperation among States in the region. It was concluded under the auspices of IMO on 29 January 2009.[17] The signatories to this Code have committed themselves to reviewing their national legislation to ensure that there are national laws in place to criminalize piracy and armed robbery at sea, and adequate guidelines for the exercise of jurisdiction, and the conduct of investigations and prosecutions of alleged offenders. They have committed to capacity-building through cooperating among themselves in the repression of piracy and armed robbery at sea, and sharing information. IMO has undertaken a broad capacity-building initiative to assist the signatories in the implementation of the Djibouti Code of Conduct.[18] It has also adopted a series of other guidance documents on how to prevent, prepare for, and react to incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea,[19] including the Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships.[20]

## B. Security Council and General Assembly resolutions

14. The Security Council has established an additional framework for States cooperating with the Transitional Federal Government to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea. In resolution 1816 (2008) of 2 June 2008, the Security Council called on all States to "cooperate in determining jurisdiction, and in the investigation and prosecution of persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia", consistent with applicable international law. In the same resolution, the Security Council decided that, for a period of six months, States cooperating with the Transitional Federal Government in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, for which advance notification has been provided by the Transitional Federal Government to the Secretary-General, may "[e]nter the territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing acts of piracy

[15] See International Maritime Organization resolution A.26/Res.1025 (2009) for a definition of armed robbery.

[16] Armed robbery at sea also constitutes an offence under the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention).

[17] It has 15 signatories: Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Somalia, the Sudan, United Republic of Tanzania and Yemen.

[18] A multi-donor Djibouti Code Trust Fund has been established in this regard.

[19] See www.imo.org; IMO adopted a revised version of its Recommendations to Governments for preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships, Guidance to ship-owners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, and the Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships.

[20] See International Maritime Organization resolution A.26/Res.1025 (2009).

and armed robbery at sea, in a manner consistent with such action permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under relevant international law", and "[u]se, within the territorial waters of Somalia, in a manner consistent with action permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under relevant international law, all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery". This authorization has been extended for successive one-year periods pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1846 (2008) of 2 December 2008 and 1897 (2009) of 30 November 2009.

15. In resolution 1846 (2008), the Security Council also noted that the SUA Convention provides for parties to create criminal offences, establish jurisdiction and accept delivery of persons responsible for, or suspected of, seizing or exercising control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of intimidation. It urged States parties to the SUA Convention to fully implement their obligations under this Convention, and to cooperate with the Secretary-General and IMO to build judicial capacity for the successful prosecution of persons suspected of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia. In resolution 1851 (2008) of 16 December 2008, the Security Council decided that for 12 months States and regional organizations cooperating in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, for which prior notification had been provided by the Transitional Federal Government to the Secretary-General, could "undertake all necessary measures that are appropriate in Somalia, for the purposes of suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea" in accordance with "applicable international humanitarian and human rights law". Further, Security Council resolution 1897 (2009) called on States to assist Somalia, at the request of the Transitional Federal Government and with notification to the Secretary-General, to strengthen capacity in Somalia, including regional authorities, to bring to justice those who are using Somali territory to plan, facilitate or undertake criminal acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, consistent with applicable international human rights law.

16. The General Assembly has also called upon States to take appropriate steps under their national law to facilitate the apprehension and prosecution of suspected pirates[21] and urged all States, in cooperation with IMO, to actively combat piracy and armed robbery at sea by adopting national legislation.[22] The Security Council, in its resolution 1918 (2010), noted with concern that "the domestic law of a number of States lacks provisions criminalizing piracy and/or procedural provisions for effective criminal prosecution of suspected pirates".

## C. National law and implementation of the international regime

17. Piracy is a crime that has existed in national jurisdictions, in some cases, for hundreds of years.[23] The elements that are needed within the national jurisdiction for successful prosecutions are criminal offences of piracy and armed robbery at sea; criminal responsibility of those who participate in, or attempt to commit, such offences; provisions establishing national criminal jurisdiction over piracy offences committed on the high seas; and the necessary evidentiary and procedural provisions to conduct prosecutions.

[21] See General Assembly resolution 64/71, para. 72.

[22] Ibid., para. 74.

[23] The legislation of the United States is over 100 years old, whereas the piracy law of Seychelles is only two months old.

18. The general legal framework that applies to the criminal trial procedure, and the rules of evidence, are determined by the traditions of the State concerned. The prosecutions of those suspected of piracy have taken place in States from common law, civil law and Islamic law traditions. This variation is a natural consequence of the existence of universal jurisdiction over acts of piracy. While it has been suggested that it may be unsatisfactory to have individuals who commit similar offences off the coast of Somalia facing different forms of trial, this same variation applies to persons accused of other extraterritorial offences, including transnational organized crime, terrorism and drug smuggling. Further, the national court determines the sentence in accordance with its own traditions. In general, most legal systems reflect the seriousness of the crime of piracy with an appropriately serious penalty.

# IV. Current approach to prosecuting and imprisoning persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia

## A. National prosecutions

19. Prosecutions of acts of piracy are currently ongoing in 10 States: Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia (in the Somaliland and Puntland regions), Maldives, Yemen, the Netherlands, United States of America, France, Spain and Germany. The prosecutions taking place in the regional States either follow apprehension and transfer by patrolling naval States, or arrest by the law enforcement or military forces of the prosecuting State. The following table sets out the numbers of each as at May 2010.[2]

| | *Prosecutions following arrest by patrolling naval States* | *Prosecutions following arrest by own forces* | *Total* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kenya | 123 | 0 | 123 |
| Somalia (Somaliland) | 20 | 80 | 100 |
| Somalia (Puntland) | 60 | 148 | 208 |
| Seychelles | 11 | 20 | 31 |
| Yemen | Not known, but some reported | Not known | 60 (estimate) |
| **Total** | | | **528** |

20. The figures in the table do not indicate the numbers of suspects who are apprehended by patrolling naval States but released. The commanders of the European and NATO naval forces off the coast of Somalia estimate that around 700 suspects apprehended by the ships under their command have been released between January and June 2010. The principal reason cited is lack of evidence sufficient to support prosecution. The majority of these suspects have apparently been released owing to a lack of sufficient evidence for prosecution. This is an issue that would arise irrespective of whether prosecutions are conducted in national courts or in a new judicial mechanism. Some have been released by patrolling naval States that do not have transfer arrangements with regional States, and have adopted a policy of seizing the weapons and then freeing the suspects. Some suspects have been released owing to a failure of the naval patrolling State to find a State, either in

the region or elsewhere, that will agree to accept the transfer of the suspects for trial.

21. In Kenya, there have been 14 prosecutions of 123 suspects since 2006. Nine of these prosecutions concern suspects transferred by the European Union; three prosecutions concern suspects transferred by the United States; two prosecutions concern suspects transferred by the United Kingdom. Two prosecutions are complete: 10 pirates transferred by the United States have each been sentenced to eight years of imprisonment, and eight pirates transferred by the United Kingdom have each been sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment. The opening of a new high security courtroom on 24 June 2010 in Shimo La Tewa, Mombasa, built by the UNODC Counter-Piracy Programme, will enhance Kenya's capacity to conduct piracy prosecutions and prosecutions of other serious criminal offences. In Seychelles, there have been three prosecutions since January 2010. One prosecution concerns suspects transferred by the European Union, and two prosecutions concern suspects arrested by Seychelles. Judicial proceedings have commenced in all of these cases.

22. There are around 40 prosecutions taking place outside the region. In general, patrolling naval States have returned suspects to their own jurisdictions for prosecution where they have a strong national interest, e.g., its flag vessel was attacked, or the crew members were its nationals. However, in practice, most prosecutions take place in the above-mentioned regional States. There are significant logistical challenges for the patrolling naval States in returning suspects for trial in their own jurisdictions. There are concerns about the human rights implications of lengthy detention at sea, and the challenges involved in ensuring prompt access to legal advice and judicial scrutiny while at sea. There are also worries about potential claims for asylum by suspects if brought to the territory of patrolling naval States for prosecution. Finally, some patrolling naval States believe that by providing warships, which are expensive and resource-intensive, they are contributing sufficiently to international counter-piracy efforts.

23. For these reasons, a number of patrolling naval States, and the European Union, have negotiated arrangements directly with regional States that allow for the transfer of suspects and all related evidence to regional States. So far, Canada, China, Denmark, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union have transfer arrangements with Kenya,[24] and the United Kingdom and the European Union have transfer arrangements with Seychelles. Under these transfer arrangements, the patrolling naval State or organization apprehends and detains suspects at sea, and requests their transfer to the receiving State. The receiving State decides whether to accept the transfer, including on the basis of a preliminary assessment of the available evidence.[25] The arrangements also provide for the treatment of the suspects in accordance with international human rights standards. Other patrolling naval States and organizations are currently also seeking such arrangements with regional States. There remains a strong need to identify additional States to accept transfers of suspects. Seychelles, with very limited prison capacity, has made the acceptance of suspected pirates conditional on agreement that they be transferred to Somalia to serve any sentence.

[24] The Government of the United Kingdom signed on 11 December 2008 a memorandum of understanding with Kenya for the transfer of pirates.

[25] Both Kenya and Seychelles have refused the transfer of suspects in cases where the evidence was insufficient to provide a realistic prospect of conviction.

## B. United Nations assistance

24. A number of United Nations offices are involved in the field in assisting States to prosecute and imprison persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, including UNODC, UNDP, UNPOS and IMO.

25. UNODC runs assistance programmes in Kenya, Seychelles and the Puntland and Somaliland regions of Somalia. Kenya and Seychelles also benefit from assistance provided by the European Union and the States that have concluded transfer arrangements with them. The assistance provided by the European Union and these States is principally delivered under the UNODC Counter-Piracy Programme, although some of them also provide substantial assistance on a bilateral basis. IMO provides assistance to regional maritime authorities to develop measures to reduce the chance of piracy attacks, and supports UNODC assistance to States in the region to review and improve their counter-piracy legislation. UNDP's work in the Somali courts, and on Somalia's counter-piracy legislation with UNODC and IMO, is critical to long-term efforts to see fair and efficient trials held there.

26. UNODC assistance and capacity-building programmes are largely focused on Kenya and Seychelles, and are in practice linked to these States' transfer arrangements with patrolling naval States and the European Union, because these patrolling naval States and the European Union provide financing. The assistance provided to each State is dependent on the particular needs that are identified in that State. The assistance benefits the national criminal justice system as a whole, not just piracy prosecutions of suspects transferred by naval States, and aims to ensure that the trials and detention are fair and efficient. The main elements of the programme are legislative review and assistance, support to the police, prosecution and judiciary, the provision of logistics and information technology, witness and trial support, prison repairs and refurbishments, training of maritime authorities, prison management and officers, and the development and sharing of regional expertise on these matters. The opening of the high security courtroom in Shimo La Tewa, Mombasa, built by UNODC, will enhance Kenya's capacity to prosecute piracy cases and to prosecute other serious criminal offences. UNODC's development of handover guidance manuals with Kenya and Seychelles has improved the quality of evidence being collected and transferred by patrolling naval States, and should assist in ensuring successful prosecutions. The UNODC programme in Kenya was commenced with funding of $2.3 million, designed to last 18 months and to cover around 30 prosecutions, each with multiple accused. Its programme in Seychelles was commenced with funding of $1.1 million, designed to last 18 months, and to cover prosecutions of around 40 suspects.

27. UNODC is currently also working with the United Republic of Tanzania, Mauritius and Maldives, which are considering undertaking piracy prosecutions. UNODC has completed an assessment mission to Mauritius and Maldives, and has been asked to conduct an assessment mission in the United Republic of Tanzania. It is anticipated that the programme in the United Republic of Tanzania will produce capacity to conduct a similar number of piracy prosecutions as Kenya. UNODC estimates that if Kenya, Seychelles, the United Republic of Tanzania and Mauritius can all be engaged and fully supported, their capacity to prosecute should reach 600 to 800 suspects per year.

28. UNODC assistance in Somalia has three main components: prison reform, legal reform and capacity-building in relation to prosecutions, complementing the work of UNDP, which is engaged in training for the judiciary and police, as well as refurbishment of court infrastructure, in each of the regions of Somalia. The work of UNODC is currently funded to approximately $1.2 million by the International Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. It is notable that Somalia, in the regions of Puntland and Somaliland, has prosecuted and imprisoned more of those responsible for acts of piracy than all other States combined. UNODC, however, has concluded that significant further assistance is necessary for these prosecutions to meet international standards, in particular in relation to standards of evidence adduced and the provision of legal representation to defendants.

## C. Imprisonment and repatriation

29. Imprisonment of those convicted for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia is a critical issue. It is estimated that the imprisonment requirement by the end of 2011 might be as high as 2,000 persons.[26] This number is much higher than that generated by all of the existing tribunals. Currently, the States conducting prosecutions are detaining the suspects pending trial, and imprisoning those who are convicted. The sentences may be lengthy. In Kenya, for example, sentences of 8 and 20 years have been imposed. As the Chair of Working Group 2 of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia said in his speech to the General Assembly on 14 May 2010, it is apparent from the experience over the last year that the long-term burden of prosecution is not the prosecution itself, but the consequent imprisonment.

30. Many States in discussions in Working Group 2 on legal issues of the Contact Group considered that it is in the interests of those convicted, and of the enforcing State, that they serve their sentences in the region because of cultural, linguistic and family considerations. For small regional States such as Seychelles, the relative burden of imprisonment is greater than for larger States. The 31 suspects currently held on remand pending trial in Seychelles account for nearly 10 per cent of the prison population. In Kenya, the 123 individuals detained either as suspects or following conviction account for 0.2 per cent of the prison population.

31. All States in the region that are conducting prosecutions, or are considering doing so, have raised the issue of the need to share the burden of imprisonment with third States. Given the origin of most of the suspects, imprisonment in Somalia would be the ideal. Apprehending and prosecuting States considering entering into enforcement of sentence agreements with Somalia in the future are likely to seek assurances about the standards of detention. Additionally, the existing transfer arrangements between patrolling naval States and regional States require the regional State to obtain the permission of the naval State before any transfer of the individuals concerned to any third State. Although Somalia, specifically the Puntland region, has indicated a willingness to accept Somalis convicted in other jurisdictions for imprisonment,[27] assistance is needed to bring prisons up to

[26] There are nearly 600 suspected or convicted pirates detained around the world at the present time.

[27] The Puntland region has also indicated that it will accept the transfer of Somali suspects for prosecution.

international standards.[28] UNDP and UNODC are completing construction of a new prison in Somaliland. UNDP will complete construction of a new prison in Puntland by the end of 2010, and UNODC is refurbishing an existing prison in Puntland. UNODC is working with the authorities of the regions of Puntland and Somaliland to train staff to improve the conditions of detention.

32. Repatriation is a further important issue raised by regional States conducting prosecutions or considering doing so. This situation arises either where a prosecution does not proceed, for example, for lack of evidence, or the accused is acquitted. These States request assurance that such individuals can be repatriated, usually to Somalia, and that the costs of such repatriation should not fall to them.

## D. The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and the International Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia

33. The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia[29] was established on 14 January 2009, to facilitate discussion and coordination of actions among States and organizations to suppress piracy off the coast of Somalia. The Security Council, in resolution 1851 (2008), encouraged "all States and regional organizations fighting piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia to establish an international cooperation mechanism to act as a common point of contact between and among States, regional organizations and international organizations on all aspects of combating piracy and armed robbery at sea off Somalia's coast". The Contact Group leads and coordinates the efforts of States and relevant organizations to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia.

34. The terms of reference for the International Trust Fund were negotiated in the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, and were formally endorsed by the United Nations Controller and the Contact Group on 27 January 2010. The International Trust Fund has the principal purpose of meeting expenses associated with the prosecution and detention of suspected pirates, as well as other activities related to implementing the objectives of the Contact Group, including supporting relevant legal capacity-building activities. It has received a total of $2,973,900 since its establishment, and has disbursed $2,437,372 to fund a total of six projects supporting prosecution and detention-related activities in Kenya, Seychelles and Somalia, and one project implementing a strategy to enable the Transitional Federal Government to raise awareness among Somali populations of the risks associated with involvement in piracy and other criminal activities, as well as of alternative livelihood options.

[28] The prisons suffer from severe overcrowding, in part owing to the deterioration or collapse of buildings that date back to the colonial era.

[29] The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia currently has 47 States and 7 intergovernmental organizations (African Union, European Union, INTERPOL, IMO, League of Arab States, NATO, and the United Nations Secretariat) that participate in the meetings; shipping industry groups also attend as observers. See annex II to the present report for more details on the Contact Group and the International Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.

# V. Consideration of options as requested by the Security Council

## A. Considerations common to those options involving United Nations participation in new judicial mechanisms

### Preliminaary considerations

35. A potential host State would need to be identified for any of the possible new judicial mechanisms set out in subsection B below. It would then be necessary to ascertain the preferences of that potential host State, including whether it would accept international participation in a new judicial mechanism, and if so, in what form. The advantages and the disadvantages of the options are therefore analysed in the present report in the light of general considerations that apply. The need for sufficient arrangements for imprisonment in the region, ideally in Somalia, may be as critical as the options for prosecution. This is particularly so given the large numbers of suspects apprehended by patrolling naval States. The need for such imprisonment arrangements to be developed is likely to be a significant factor in any process to seek to identify a potential host State for a new judicial mechanism.

36. The Security Council's request emphasizes the important goal of achieving and sustaining substantive results. A key consideration in this respect would be the need for sufficient political and financial commitment among States, in difficult economic times, not only to establish a new judicial mechanism, but to sustain it. A new judicial mechanism to address piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia would address a different situation to that addressed by the existing United Nations and United Nations-assisted tribunals. Such mechanism would face ongoing criminal activity and potentially a large caseload, with no predictable completion date.

37. A key decision, if a new judicial mechanism were to be established, would be whether its purpose would be to prosecute as many suspects as possible who are apprehended off the coast of Somalia, or to focus on those who finance or plan acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, or both. Until more is known about the extent to which acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea are organized, or are opportunistic, it is difficult to determine whether focusing prosecutions on those who finance and organize these acts would help to prevent them occurring. Further, if a new judicial mechanism were to have jurisdiction over those who finance and organize, it would be dependent on the cooperation of the States where such persons are located for the investigation and transfer of suspects.

### Mandates and legal bases

38. If a decision were made to establish a new judicial mechanism with United Nations participation, whichever option is chosen, the Secretary-General would need a mandate from a political organ of the United Nations. The legal basis for a new judicial mechanism would depend upon the particular option chosen, but in general terms it would be either a Security Council resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, or an agreement negotiated between the United Nations and the State or States concerned. In the latter case, the process would be triggered by a Security Council resolution requesting the Secretary-General to enter into discussions and negotiations with the State or States, and to report further to the Council. To determine what kind of United Nations

participation there should be in the judicial mechanism, the key first step would be to assess the needs of the mechanism and/or the State or States concerned.

**Jurisdiction**

39. The crime that would form the basis of the judicial mechanism's jurisdiction would be piracy as defined in article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which reflects customary international law. This crime would need to be reflected in the national law of the host State, or in the jurisdiction of the new mechanism, depending upon the option in question. It would need to be determined whether the jurisdiction should also include the crime of armed robbery at sea. As a crime that takes place within the territorial sea of a State, it is not defined under international law, but in the national jurisdictions of individual States, and naturally falls within the jurisdiction of the territorial State where the crime takes place. If this crime were to be included within the jurisdiction of a new judicial mechanism, therefore, it would need to be determined whether the crime should be limited to acts taking place within the territorial sea of Somalia, or should extend, for example, to acts taking place within the territorial sea of the host State or other regional States. In any of these cases, the question of the consent of the territorial State would arise.

**Primacy or complementarity**

40. A further important consideration is whether any new judicial mechanism should have primacy over national jurisdictions or whether the principle of complementarity should apply. In respect of acts of piracy on the high seas, or in areas beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any State, all States have jurisdiction under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and customary international law to apprehend suspected pirates and to prosecute them. Moreover, there may be, for example, strong reasons for a particular State to assert jurisdiction, e.g., where its nationals, or a vessel flying its flag, are victims of an act of piracy. In respect of acts of armed robbery at sea, which take place within the territorial sea of a State, it might be natural for the territorial State to wish to have the first option of prosecuting.

41. In the light of the foregoing, and considering that there are large numbers of suspects, it would need to be considered whether a new judicial mechanism with United Nations participation should have primacy over national jurisdictions. The application of the principle of complementarity may be more appropriate. In that case, a new judicial mechanism would have jurisdiction only if there were no State willing and able to investigate and prosecute. Given the circumstances in which suspects are apprehended at sea and transferred by naval ships, real practical difficulties may face the judicial mechanism in making a rapid determination of whether there are any States willing and able to investigate and prosecute.

**Geographic limits of jurisdiction**

42. Defining the geographic limits of the jurisdiction of the judicial mechanism would be essential if its jurisdiction were not to be global. Security Council resolution 1918 (2010) refers to acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, but that general reference would not be sufficient to determine the geographic limits of the criminal jurisdiction of a judicial mechanism. The

possibilities for determining the geographic jurisdiction would include specifying a particular area of the ocean off the coast of Somalia, extending into the Gulf of Aden and out into the Indian Ocean, delimited by coordinates of longitude and latitude. Acts of piracy have now taken place up to 1,200 nautical miles from the coast, and therefore, if all such acts are to be within the jurisdiction of any judicial mechanism, the area delimited would need to be extremely large.

43. An alternative for limiting the geographical jurisdiction, discussed by Working Group 2, was to define it in terms of acts of piracy or armed robbery at sea that originate in Somalia. Although this approach may appear to be a possibility, the difficulties of defining the elements that determine whether an act originates in Somalia would be considerable. Such definition would require proof of the origin of an act in order for a judicial mechanism to assert jurisdiction.

**Temporal jurisdiction**

44. A new judicial mechanism would also require temporal limits on its jurisdiction. This would include a commencement date. One of the questions that arose in the context of Working Group 2 on legal issues of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia was whether a judicial mechanism could prosecute crimes that occurred before its establishment. It is evident from the experience of the existing tribunals that in principle this is the case. In relation to established crimes, such as piracy, there would be no risk of the mechanism prosecuting acts that were not crimes at the time when committed. If the judicial mechanism were to have jurisdiction over any newly formulated crimes, care would be needed to ensure that the new mechanism did not prosecute acts that took place prior to the establishment of the mechanism and its jurisdiction, which could be contrary to the principle of *nullum crimen sine lege*. It is difficult to envisage at this stage an end date for the temporal jurisdiction of such a judicial mechanism. This issue may need to be resolved in the future, in the context of consideration of a completion and residual strategy, and taking into account Somalia's future capacity to conduct prosecutions itself.

**Personal jurisdiction**

45. There are hundreds of piracy incidents happening off the coast of Somalia each year, each involving a number of individuals. If the jurisdiction of a new mechanism were to extend to all apprehended suspects, its capacity to prosecute potentially large numbers would be key. A critical difference between the existing tribunals and a possible judicial mechanism for piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia is that the existing tribunals first investigate and decide whether to issue an indictment before issuing an arrest warrant and requesting the transfer of the suspect to the tribunal. Any potential host State and/or judicial mechanism would therefore need to consider whether it should be obliged to receive all such suspects from patrolling naval States, or whether it would either have a right of refusal of particular transfers, or could place a limit on the total numbers of suspects received in any given time period.

**Juveniles**

46. A significant number of suspects apprehended may be, or may claim to be, juveniles. The Security Council would need to consider whether special provision

should be made for their treatment. If the precedent of the statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone[30] were followed, a new judicial mechanism would not have jurisdiction over anyone who is under the age of 15 at the time of the alleged commission of the offences. The requirement would be that those between the ages of 15 and 18 at the time of the alleged commission of the offences are treated with dignity and a sense of worth, and in accordance with international human rights standards, in particular the rights of the child. Account should be taken as far as possible of the desirability of promoting rehabilitation and reintegration, and avoiding imprisonment. Many suspects apprehended have no identification papers, and sometimes no precise knowledge of their own age. There may be real practical difficulties, therefore, in determining their age with any certainty.

**Time necessary for the establishment and commencement of functioning**

47. Experience of the existing United Nations and United Nations-assisted tribunals[31] demonstrates that the time necessary for the establishment and the commencement of functioning of any judicial mechanism after a mandate has been given by a political organ of the United Nations varies, and may be considerable. This period has varied from around one year to around nine years until the commencement of functioning. Discussions in Working Group 2 suggested that the speed of setting up any new mechanism would be a key consideration. Although the view was expressed in those discussions that establishing a special chamber within a national jurisdiction might be among the most rapid options, United Nations experience suggests that this is not necessarily the case. The shortest timelines were achieved when the Security Council established ICTY and ICTR as subsidiary bodies.[32]

**Costs and financing**

48. Experience has demonstrated that considerable political and financial commitment by States is necessary to establish and sustain a new judicial mechanism.[33] Costs of the existing tribunals and other judicial mechanisms have ranged from around $14.3 million (the East Timor Special Panels for a biennium)[34] to $376.2 million (ICTY for a biennium).[34] The most expensive have been ICTY and ICTR, which are international tribunals that have prosecuted relatively large numbers of indictees charged with complex international crimes. Mechanisms based in the national jurisdiction of a State have proved relatively less expensive. Potential costs were a key concern raised within Working Group 2.

49. The fact that the crimes of piracy and armed robbery at sea are not complex international crimes may mean that proceedings are shorter than those in the existing tribunals and special chambers. However, the high numbers of suspects and the ongoing nature of the problem will have an impact on the costs and the potential duration of any new judicial mechanism. Further, although the crimes are not complex, experience has shown that there may be difficult evidentiary challenges to overcome when evidence is gathered by a patrolling naval State and transferred to a

[30] See annex I for more details on the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
[31] See annex I.
[32] See annex I for more details on the time needed to establish the various existing tribunals.
[33] For Special Panels in East Timor, see annex I.
[34] For ICTY, see annex I.

regional prosecuting State. This evidentiary factor may have an impact on the costs and success of any new judicial mechanism.

50. The basis of funding would also be an important consideration. Funding from United Nations assessed contributions would spread the financial burden, and provide predictable financing that enables forward planning. The responsibility of financing voluntarily funded tribunals has in practice fallen on a relatively small group of States, and has given rise to management challenges when funds run low. Sufficient and sustained financial commitment by States is one of the key issues that would need to be considered in establishing any new judicial mechanism. Some of the existing tribunals have requirements for contributions to the funding by the affected State. In the situation of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, many States, particularly regional States, and the international community as a whole, are affected. Any State that is willing to host a new judicial mechanism would, in fact, be taking on a task that is to the benefit of the international community. There may therefore be strong grounds for the view that any willing host State should not have to bear unreasonable financial costs nor other burdens.

51. The current bilateral arrangements between certain patrolling naval States and the European Union and Kenya and Seychelles demonstrate that financing may in practice be provided by those States and organizations that are able to transfer suspected pirates for prosecution under such arrangements.[35] If a new judicial mechanism were to enter into arrangements to receive suspects from patrolling naval States and organizations, it should be considered whether such transfers of suspects should be linked to financing by those States and organizations. A further issue that was discussed in Working Group 2 was the possibility of the shipping industry contributing to the costs of furthering the aim of prosecuting and imprisoning persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia. The terms of reference of the International Trust Fund were drafted to allow for this.[36]

52. As the costs of even the least expensive of the options for a judicial mechanism are significant, it is clear that using the International Trust Fund to finance any such mechanism may risk severely depleting it. Consideration would therefore need to be given as to how to protect funds in the International Trust Fund intended for supporting national prosecution and imprisonment projects. Further, insofar as the International Trust Fund is used for projects to strengthen the rule of law in Somalia, allowing its use to finance a new judicial mechanism would risk drawing funds away from addressing the cause of Somalia's instability, to deal with a symptom of that instability.

**Cooperation**

53. An additional major consideration would be the need for any new judicial mechanism, or in the case of a special chamber within a national jurisdiction, the host State, to negotiate and enter into agreements with third States on enforcement of sentences, and the relocation of those acquitted, and of witnesses, if necessary.[37]

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[35] It is understood that there is no such requirement in the bilateral transfer arrangements, but that in practice the naval States fund technical assistance and capacity-building in the receiving States.

[36] Although, notably, no such contributions have yet been received by the International Trust Fund.

[37] The United Nations would not participate in any national jurisdiction or new judicial mechanism that imposes the death penalty.

Sentence enforcement agreements would most appropriately be concluded with States in the region, ideally close to or within Somalia. Any judicial mechanism with United Nations participation would need to ensure that prison conditions would be to international standards, and that enforcement agreements between the judicial mechanism or host State and third States contain provisions to this effect, and for the protection of human rights. It would need to be considered whether the prisons being developed in the Puntland and Somaliland regions of Somalia with UNDP and UNODC assistance will meet international standards. Enforcement agreements should provide for the monitoring of their implementation in third States by the mechanism or host State. Agreements would also be required between the judicial mechanism or host State and the patrolling naval States to provide a legal basis for the transfer of suspects to the mechanism, to deal with the transfer of evidence to the mechanism, and to provide for the protection of the human rights of those apprehended, detained at sea and transferred.

#### Completion and residual issues

54. The political and financial commitment needed for the establishment and functioning of a judicial mechanism does not end with the closure of that mechanism. Experience of the existing tribunals demonstrates that there are certain essential functions that must continue beyond the life of any criminal judicial mechanism. These include the supervision of enforcement of sentences, the review of judgments, the continued protection of witnesses, and management of the archives. These are potentially long-term functions that may require some form of residual mechanism to succeed the judicial mechanism. These functions could well require continued United Nations participation with a view to ensuring that they are carried out to international standards. Even in the options that are based in a national jurisdiction, where the court or special chamber will continue indefinitely, the termination of United Nations participation at some stage would be likely to require a continued United Nations presence after that termination to monitor the carrying out of the functions to international standards.

## B. Consideration of options to further the aim of prosecuting and imprisoning persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia

### Option 1: The enhancement of United Nations assistance to build capacity of regional States to prosecute and imprison persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia

#### Political support

55. Option 1 is already ongoing and has achieved some success. Kenya's opening of a new high security courtroom, built by the UNODC Counter-Piracy Programme, will enhance Kenya's capacity to conduct piracy prosecutions and prosecutions of other serious criminal offences. Strong political support for the roles played by Kenya and Seychelles has been important, and will be key as their cooperation with the international community continues to develop. To increase capacity to prosecute the large number of suspects apprehended by patrolling naval States, more States in the region should be encouraged to receive transfers of suspects for prosecution. This will require political engagement with regional States by the international

community, including potentially through the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. While assistance programmes for Kenya and Seychelles are adequately funded for the next year, further funding will be necessary to ensure that these programmes can continue and that assistance can be extended to other States in the region that are willing to accept the transfer of suspects for prosecution. It will be essential that the attention of the international community on this problem is sustained, and that financial support continue.

**Advantages and disadvantages**

56. One of the main advantages of option 1 is that it is already functioning and has demonstrated that it is effective. Prosecutions of nearly 600 suspected pirates have been conducted, or are ongoing, in 10 national jurisdictions over the past two years. This capacity compares favourably with the existing tribunals. National trials are also relatively rapid, taking around 12 to 18 months to complete from the time of arrest. The financial costs of assistance to national trials and imprisonment are modest compared to the costs of any of the other options. Assistance to national jurisdictions benefits the criminal justice system of the State as a whole, not only piracy prosecutions. Achieving this in Somalia over the longer term is likely to be key to enabling Somalia to play a role in the solution to piracy and armed robbery at sea off its coast. The other options all involve new judicial mechanisms, even where based in a national jurisdiction, and may tend to draw resources and experience from the existing national criminal justice systems.

57. Possible disadvantages of this option include the fact that patrolling naval States do not know at the time of apprehending suspects at sea whether they will be able to transfer them to a prosecuting State. The most common reason for the release of suspects is lack of sufficient evidence to support prosecution, rather than lack of a regional State to accept them. This may, however, also be a disadvantage in relation to any of the other options below, and guidance on the collection and the transfer of evidence to any new mechanism is likely to be required. Not all patrolling naval States have arrangements for transfer of suspects to regional States, and thus may adopt policies of disarming and releasing them at sea. The establishment of a new judicial mechanism under any of the options below may open possibilities for further patrolling naval States to enter into arrangements for the transfer of suspects for prosecution. The fact that current arrangements for the transfer of suspects depend on only two regional States makes the situation vulnerable if political circumstances change. There is a need to increase the number of regional prosecuting States, and to share the burden of both prosecution and imprisonment.

**Cooperation**

58. To assist the regional States conducting prosecutions, and to encourage further regional States to accept the transfer of suspects for prosecution, urgent attention is required to address the problem of imprisonment of the large numbers convicted, who are mainly Somalis. Additionally, those not prosecuted and those acquitted should be repatriated. To address this problem, third States willing to accept such persons should be identified and assistance provided, as needed, to improve prison conditions. Ideally, Somalia should receive the majority, and, to this end, UNODC and UNDP are providing assistance to improve standards of prisons in the Puntland and Somaliland regions of Somalia. Agreements between the prosecuting States and

third States, principally Somalia, will need to be concluded for this purpose. Continued financing for these projects is essential if the problem of imprisonment in the region is to be effectively addressed.

59. Agreements on the enforcement of sentences concluded by the existing tribunals are on a request and acceptance basis in relation to any specific case. There is no obligation to accept any particular convicted person, nor indeed to accept any at all. Given the large numbers of persons convicted, it is not clear that such agreements would be effective to relieve the burden on the prosecuting States, and to encourage further States to accept suspects for prosecution. One issue for consideration, therefore, is whether agreements for the enforcement of sentences with third States, and in particular Somalia, should oblige these States to receive all of those put forward for imprisonment.

**The role of Somalia**

60. A long-term solution to the problem of prosecuting and imprisoning those responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea should lie in Somalia itself. The regions of Puntland and Somaliland are conducting prosecutions, and imprisoning, but significant assistance is needed to improve standards. Currently, far less financing is provided for assistance programmes in Somalia than for Kenya and Seychelles. Donors have sufficient confidence in trials and imprisonment in Kenya and Seychelles to direct their financing to those States, but given the fractured nature of the law on piracy within Somalia, and significant issues concerning Somali judicial and prosecutorial capacity, appear at this stage not to have sufficient confidence to direct the same level of financing to Somalia. Although the regions of Puntland and Somaliland face significant challenges in meeting international standards, it may be preferable for the international community to increase its funding to assist Somalia to achieve international standards rather than to risk any decline in Somalia's efforts to investigate and prosecute piracy itself.

**Security Council**

61. The Security Council may wish to consider continuing, and building on, the role it has played in its resolutions[38] to enhance option 1, as follows:

(i) Commending Kenya, Seychelles and other States engaged in prosecutions for their role;

(ii) Commending the work of UNODC and UNDP in assisting States in the region to conduct prosecutions and to imprison those convicted;

(iii) Commending the work of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia in leading and coordinating international efforts on prosecution and imprisonment of acts of piracy, and encouraging further such work;

(iv) Commending patrolling naval States for their role in suppressing acts of piracy, and encouraging them to work with UNODC and regional States to ensure that evidence collected is sufficient to provide a sound basis for prosecutions;

[38] See Security Council resolutions 1816 (2008), 1846 (2008), 1851 (2008), 1897 (2009) and 1918 (2010).

(v) Urging further States in the region to accept the transfer of suspects from patrolling naval States for prosecution;

(vi) Urging all States, in particular flag, port and coastal States, and States of the nationality of victims and perpetrators, to conduct prosecutions;

(vii) Calling upon all States to ensure that they have the relevant jurisdiction, offences, and procedures to enable them to prosecute acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia;

(viii) Encouraging States to consider the financing of assistance to States in the region, including through the International Trust Fund, to conduct prosecutions and to imprison those convicted;

(ix) Encouraging States to consider financing assistance, including through the International Trust Fund, to enhance the standards of prosecution and imprisonment in Somalia and its regions;

(x) Encouraging the shipping industry to contribute to the International Trust Fund.

**Option 2: The establishment of a Somali court sitting in the territory of a third State in the region, either with or without United Nations participation**

62. An option not specifically mentioned in Security Council resolution 1918 (2010), but discussed in the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia,[39] would be a Somali court sitting in the territory of another regional State, either with or without participation by the United Nations.[40] Such a court, like the Lockerbie court,[41] would be an example of a national court exercising its national jurisdiction, but sitting in the territory of a third State. The national jurisdiction in this event would be that of Somalia, not the host State. The host State would be providing a secure environment for the trials to take place under Somali law. The necessary arrangements to enable such a court to be established would be a matter for Somalia and the host State to negotiate. If it were established with participation by United Nations selected judges, prosecutors and/or staff, this would also require agreement between the United Nations, Somalia and the host State.

63. Ideally, the host State should be in the region, so that it would have the advantage of proximity for the purpose of the transfer of apprehended suspects by patrolling naval States, and the transfer of those convicted to third States for imprisonment. Identifying such a host State may present challenges. That State would be providing all facilities necessary for the Somali court to function in its territory, without necessarily receiving any capacity-building benefits for its own criminal jurisdiction.

[39] As raised by Portugal in a non-paper during the Working Group 2 discussions and the informal meetings hosted by the Netherlands and by France in a non-paper at meeting of the Contact Group on 10 June 2010.

[40] A member of the Contact Group has informally floated the idea of possible European Union support to such a Somali court or special chamber.

[41] The Lockerbie court did not have participation by the United Nations or a regional organization.

**Advantages and disadvantages**

64. This option would have the advantage of assisting in the strengthening of the Somali judiciary, thereby contributing to the long-term efforts to achieve peace and stability in Somalia. Although in principle such an option might be expected to be among the most cost-effective, similar to the special chamber options below, in practice, the extent of United Nations assistance likely to be necessary would be considerable. Costs would therefore be likely to be higher than the special chamber options, and the time necessary for the court to commence functioning may be significantly longer.

65. Discussions in Working Group 2[42] raised significant issues concerning the adequacy of Somalia's piracy laws and the capacity of Somalia's judicial system. Although such option would have the advantage of enabling Somalia to play a direct part in the solution to prosecuting acts of piracy, it may not be a possibility at present. This conclusion is also supported by the findings of the assessment mission to the region of Working Group 1 of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.[43] Further, UNDP has underlined in Working Group 2 the wide range of challenges that the Somali judicial system continues to face.[44] Although there is some judicial capacity in Somalia and among the Somali diaspora, the challenge of establishing a Somali court meeting international standards in a third State would be considerable at present. Further, any advantages that such a court may enjoy would be outweighed if it were to draw limited judicial resources from Somalia's courts.

**Cooperation and residual issues**

66. As a Somali national court, sentences would most naturally be enforced in Somalia. However, for capacity reasons, enforcement agreements with third States may still be necessary. In addition, as a national court exercising national jurisdiction, there would be no question of a need for a residual mechanism to carry out residual functions.

**The role of Somalia**

67. For this option to be feasible, the issues above would need to be addressed. It could be borne in mind at such time in the future as Somali judicial capacity is sufficiently strengthened. It would need to be considered at that time whether it would be preferable to attempt to establish a Somali court in the territory of a third State, or to focus on working towards the long-term goal of assisting courts sitting in Somalia to meet international standards, and to receive the transfer of suspects from patrolling naval States.

[42] See annex II.

[43] See the report of Working Group 1 of the Contact Group entitled "Regional Counter-Piracy Capability Development Needs Assessment and Prioritization Mission to East Africa and the Gulf of Aden", p. 12 (20 October 2009) (unpublished).

[44] See conclusions of the Chairman of Working Group 2 of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, 5th meeting (Copenhagen, 17-18 May 2010).

### Option 3: The establishment of a special chamber within the national jurisdiction of a State or States in the region, without United Nations participation

68. This option would involve a State or States in the region setting up a special court or chamber within its national court structure to prosecute acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia. This option would not involve participation by United Nations selected judges, prosecutors and/or staff, but is likely to need technical assistance from UNODC and other relevant United Nations offices. It would therefore not require any mandate from a political organ of the United Nations or the negotiation of an agreement with the State concerned.

69. None of the regional States conducting prosecutions has a special chamber to deal with piracy and armed robbery at sea. As noted above, Kenya has opened a new high security courtroom in Shimo La Tewa, Mombasa. This courtroom will be used for piracy trials, but also trials of other crimes, and thus would not be a special chamber for piracy prosecutions. One consideration would be whether there are, or could potentially be, sufficient piracy prosecutions to justify a special chamber exclusive to piracy. Even in Kenya, which has 12 ongoing piracy prosecutions, the new courtroom at Shimo La Tewa will not be exclusive to piracy prosecutions. The regional State where the volume of prosecutions might justify a special chamber is Somalia. The courts in Puntland and Somaliland regions of Somalia handle piracy cases more regularly than any other State conducting prosecutions.

#### Advantages and disadvantages

70. A host State in the region would have the advantage of proximity for the purpose of the transfer of apprehended suspects by patrolling naval States, and the transfer of those convicted to third States for imprisonment. This option is likely to be among the most cost-effective, and would have the further advantage of being within an existing and functioning jurisdiction, with established crimes and criminal procedures. United Nations assistance to the State may help it to consider whether any improvements or amendments to the law are necessary, e.g., to determine the geographic limits of the jurisdiction, or to introduce crimes of financing or organizing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea. An important question would be whether the jurisdiction should extend to offences committed within Somalia's territorial sea, and the need for Somalia's consent.

71. A possible risk may be that the special chamber would draw resources from the criminal justice system more broadly, and may lead to a risk of "two-tier justice" if the standards of fairness and efficiency in the special chamber exceed those of other criminal courts. A further disadvantage may be limited capacity of such a chamber.

#### Cooperation and residual issues

72. If the host State is not Somalia, it would be critical for it to negotiate and conclude agreements with other States for the enforcement of sentences. Arrangements or agreements would also be necessary between the host State and the patrolling naval States to provide a legal basis for the transfer of suspected pirates, the transfer of evidence, and also for the protection of the rights of the detainees. Important considerations would include whether the host State should be obliged to receive transfers from patrolling naval States, whether the host State should have the option of refusing any particular transfer, or whether there should be limits on the

numbers transferred in any given time period. As the special chamber would be within the national jurisdiction of a State, without United Nations participation, there would be no question of a completion or residual strategy.

**Option 4: The establishment of a special chamber within the national jurisdiction of a State or States in the region, with United Nations participation**

73. This option for a special chamber within a national jurisdiction might, for example, involve the participation of United Nations selected judges within that chamber, United Nations selected prosecutors and/or staff. The legal basis for United Nations participation in a special chamber within a national jurisdiction would be an agreement between the United Nations and the host State. Implementing legislation by the host State may well be required. If the host State were one of those that is already conducting prosecutions, such as Kenya and Seychelles, there would be an additional advantage of drawing on their growing expertise.

74. The United Nations would first need to determine with the host State what form of international participation it would accept. This would include taking fully into account not only its capacity-building needs, but also its culture and legal traditions. Experience has demonstrated that, in circumstances where international participation is needed, it is likely to go beyond participation by judges in trial chambers, and extend to a more comprehensive approach involving prosecutors and/or staff. United Nations experience further shows that where a State has accepted participation by international judges, a framework should be established under which international standards of fair trial can be attained. A way of achieving this in practice has been to ensure that the international judges are in the majority in the chambers in which they sit, so that their contribution to the process and decision-making is effective. If, over time, the capacity of the national components of the special chamber is sufficiently enhanced and international standards are met, the international components may be phased out.

75. It is not clear how such participation by United Nations selected judges would work in the context of, for example, Kenya and Seychelles, or the United Republic of Tanzania and Mauritius. Even if these States were willing to accept international participation, they are all common law jurisdictions that conduct trials with a single judge. United Nations participation could not, of course, be to the exclusion of national judges. A special chamber with United Nations participation might, therefore, entail a departure from the normal structure of criminal proceedings in the host State. Care would be needed to ensure that, if international prosecutors and staff are deployed, these are limited to the needs of the host State, and there is no replication of international and national efforts, which would add to the costs. Ideally, the international judges, prosecutors and/or staff should aim to impart their knowledge and expertise so that in the longer term, their positions could be phased out and taken by nationals.

**Advantages and disadvantages**

76. A host State in the region would have the advantage of building on an existing judicial system with an established jurisdiction, including crimes and criminal procedures. Further, it would have the advantage of proximity for the purpose of the transfer of apprehended suspects by patrolling naval States, and the transfer of those convicted to third States for imprisonment. In addition to technical assistance already

provided to regional prosecuting States, United Nations participation within a national jurisdiction, if needed, would help to build capacity in that jurisdiction. Further, if United Nations selected judges, prosecutors and/or staff for deployment in a special chamber included individuals drawn from other States in the region, this would enhance regional capacity-building. If it were possible for Somali judges, prosecutors, and/or staff to be among those selected, this would also help to strengthen Somalia's judicial system, and form part of the long-term efforts to achieve peace and stability in Somalia. As with option 3, another advantage is that the special chamber would be established within an existing and functioning jurisdiction. It is also likely to be among the most cost-effective options, however, probably less cost-effective than option 3, which has no United Nations participation.

77. A possible risk may be that the special chamber would draw resources from the host State and other regional States. Moreover, a disadvantage may be the limited capacity of such a chamber to prosecute large numbers. Similar to option 3, a risk may be that financing and assistance are drawn away from the host State's criminal justice system more broadly, leading to "two-tier justice". The same question whether the jurisdiction should extend to offences committed within Somalia's territorial sea and the need for Somalia's consent would arise. Its capacity to prosecute large numbers may be similarly limited, and the same important decision would be needed as to whether the host State should be obliged to receive transfers from patrolling naval States, or should be able to limit the numbers of suspects received.

**Cooperation and residual issues**

78. A bilateral agreement between the United Nations and the host State would not provide a vehicle for agreeing cooperation and burden-sharing among States. The host State would need to negotiate and conclude agreements with other States dealing with enforcement of sentences. Arrangements or agreements would also be necessary between the host State and the patrolling naval States to provide a legal basis for the transfer of suspected pirates, the transfer of evidence, and the protection of the rights of the detainees.

79. As the special chamber would be within the national jurisdiction of a State, and there is currently no foreseeable end to the ongoing problem of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, it would be a matter for the host State to determine whether the special chamber should have a limited lifespan, or should be of indefinite duration. In the event that the host State does set a finite limit on the life of the special chamber, a completion and residual strategy would be necessary. If the host State does not set a limit on duration of the special chamber, the special chamber would not need a completion and residual strategy, but some form of continued United Nations presence may be necessary with a view to ensuring that international standards are maintained.

**Option 5: The establishment of a regional tribunal on the basis of a multilateral agreement among regional States, with United Nations participation**

80. A regional tribunal established on the basis of a multilateral agreement among States in the region should, ideally, include participation by Somalia. The agreement would provide the legal basis for the establishment of the regional tribunal, and would set out its jurisdiction. If United Nations assistance or participation is needed

and requested, discussion with the regional States would be necessary to determine whether it should be limited to technical assistance, or should also involve participation by United Nations appointed judges, prosecutors and/or staff. All such discussions should be held in close consultation with the African Union.

81. For the United Nations to participate in such a regional tribunal would require a Security Council resolution to request the Secretary-General to participate in negotiations with the regional States with a view to becoming parties to the multilateral agreement. The United Nations would need to determine with the regional States what form of international participation the tribunal would need. Although experience has demonstrated that, in circumstances where international participation has been provided for, there should be a framework within which international standards may be attained, normally through United Nations selected judges being in the majority, it would need to be considered whether this would be appropriate in a regional tribunal.

**Advantages and disadvantages**

82. This option would have the advantage of capacity-building in the region if judges, prosecutors and/or staff were drawn from jurisdictions in the region. If it were possible for this to include Somali nationals, it would also help to strengthen Somalia's judicial system and form part of the long-term efforts to achieve peace and stability in Somalia. As a tribunal based in the region, it would have the advantage of proximity for the purpose of the transfer of apprehended suspects by patrolling naval States, and the transfer of those convicted to third States for imprisonment.

83. As a new judicial mechanism, a regional tribunal would not be within an existing jurisdiction, with established crimes and procedures. The tribunal would not be able to benefit, for example, from the expertise built up by the judicial systems in Kenya and Seychelles, because it would not be embedded in either of those jurisdictions. It could only benefit from that expertise if it were to draw judges, prosecutors and/or staff from those jurisdictions. This, however, may deplete the expertise of Kenya and Seychelles and inhibit their capacity to prosecute nationally.

84. The multilateral agreement establishing the regional tribunal would need to set out the crimes, and any geographic limits on jurisdiction. The crime of piracy is well established under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and customary international law and should not present a difficulty of definition. However, if the jurisdiction were to include crimes of financing and organizing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, which are not established under the Convention, definitions would need to be negotiated among the participating States, and the United Nations if participating.

85. Unlike a special chamber within a national jurisdiction, a regional tribunal would not have a pre-existing territorial jurisdiction. The participating States and the United Nations would need to determine the geographic limits of the jurisdiction, and whether the territorial seas of the participating States, possibly including Somalia, should be within the jurisdiction or not. Given the large numbers of potential suspects to be prosecuted, a regional tribunal may have the advantage of greater human and financial resources, and therefore possibly greater capacity, compared to a special chamber within a national jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it would still be important for the participating States, and the United Nations, if

participating, to determine whether the tribunal should be obliged to receive transfers of suspects from patrolling naval States, or should be able to limit the number of suspects received.

86. A regional tribunal is unlikely to be as cost-effective as a special chamber within a national jurisdiction. The recruitment in the region and internationally of judges, prosecutors and/or staff would either need to be based on the United Nations common system for staffing and salary levels, or an appropriate regional equivalent. The tribunal, as a new institution, may need premises and incur other costs that a special chamber within a national jurisdiction would not have.

**Cooperation and residual issues**

87. A multilateral agreement among regional States would provide a vehicle for agreeing on cooperation and burden-sharing among those States. If one of the participating States is also the host State of the regional tribunal, the multilateral agreement may provide the basis upon which that State obtains the agreement of the others to enforce sentences in their territories. This, of course, would complicate the negotiations and could well add to the time necessary for its conclusion. As was noted in the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, the time required to negotiate the appropriate multilateral agreement might be considerable.

88. While a multilateral agreement among the regional States may provide the basis for cooperation and burden-sharing among them, it would not provide any basis for requiring cooperation from third States. Arrangements between the regional tribunal and the patrolling naval States would be necessary to provide a legal basis for the transfer of suspected pirates, and could also regulate the transfer of evidence to the tribunal and minimum standards for the treatment of those detained and transferred. Such arrangements might also provide for patrolling naval States to contribute to the financing of the tribunal.

89. As it is unlikely that the regional States would wish to establish a regional tribunal indefinitely, a completion and residual strategy would need to be developed at some stage. Some form of residual mechanism would be needed to carry out the residual functions after the closure of the tribunal. If there were United Nations participation in such tribunal, it would be likely to continue beyond the life of the tribunal with a view to ensuring that international standards are maintained.

**Option 6: The establishment of an international tribunal on the basis of an agreement between a State in the region and the United Nations**

90. In order to establish an international tribunal through an agreement between the United Nations and a State, the Security Council would need to request the Secretary-General to negotiate and conclude an agreement with an identified State. This would lead to the establishment of a United Nations-assisted tribunal with national participation, on the lines of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.[45] Implementing legislation may well be needed in the host State. The agreements to establish the existing United Nations-assisted tribunals have all been concluded with the affected State. It would follow that this option would most naturally be pursued with Somalia, as the State in which the

[45] For discussion of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, see annex I.

problem of piracy originates. However, the fractured nature of the law in Somalia, and significant issues concerning Somali judicial and prosecutorial capacity, mean that Somali participation in a United Nations-assisted tribunal may not be a possibility at present, as set out in option 3. This option would therefore most appropriately be pursued with a third State, ideally in the region, that would also be the host State. Given that such a State would in practice be only one of many States affected by the problem of piracy and armed robbery at sea, whether to seek to establish such a tribunal rather than pursuing options 3 or 4, involving the establishment of a special chamber within a national jurisdiction, would require careful assessment.

**Advantages and disadvantages**

91. A tribunal under this option would typically include the participation of both United Nations selected judges and national judges, international and national prosecutors, and would in practice include international and national staff. This would have the advantage of capacity-building in the host State, although perhaps to a lesser extent than option 4. If the host State were one of those that is already conducting prosecutions, such as Kenya and Seychelles, there would be an advantage of drawing on their growing expertise. However, that goal may be more effectively achieved through pursuing options 3 or 4 with either of those States, if they were willing to accept a special chamber. There may, in that event, be no particular advantage in a United Nations-assisted tribunal, which may be likely to be more time-consuming to establish and less cost-effective. Regional capacity-building through the participation of judges, prosecutors and/or staff from other jurisdictions in the region would be beneficial, but would perhaps be unlikely under this option unless there were a clear benefit to the host State.

92. As with option 4, experience has demonstrated that if United Nations participation is necessary, it is likely to go beyond judges in trial chambers, and to extend to a more comprehensive approach involving prosecutors and/or staff. Moreover, to establish a framework under which international standards of fair trial can be attained, it may be that United Nations judges would need to be in the majority in the chambers in which they sit, so that their contribution to the process and decision-making is effective. Unlike option 4, there would be no phasing out or passing of control to the national judges over time in a United Nations-assisted tribunal.

93. Whether or not the agreement to establish such a tribunal should incorporate aspects of the national law of the host State in order to set out the jurisdiction, including the crimes, would be a matter for discussion and negotiation between the host State and the United Nations. If the crimes established under national law are not incorporated into the jurisdiction of the tribunal, they would need to be defined in the agreement. Further, if crimes of financing and organizing were to be included within the tribunal's jurisdiction, they would need to be defined in the agreement, unless appropriate offences are already established in the national jurisdiction. The agreement would need to set out the geographic limits of the tribunal's jurisdiction, and whether it would include the territorial sea of the host State. If the agreement were not concluded with Somalia, another important point would be whether the jurisdiction should extend to offences committed within Somalia's territorial sea, and the need for Somalia's consent.

94. A United Nations-assisted tribunal may well have greater human and financial resources, and therefore capacity, to prosecute large numbers of suspects than does a special chamber within a national jurisdiction. However, given the large numbers of suspects, it would still be important to decide whether the tribunal should be obliged to receive transfers from patrolling naval States, or whether it should be able to limit the number of suspects received.

**Cooperation and residual issues**

95. A bilateral agreement between the United Nations and a State would not provide a vehicle for agreeing on cooperation and burden-sharing with third States. The tribunal would need to negotiate and conclude agreements with third States, ideally in the region, for the enforcement of sentences. Arrangements or agreements would also be necessary between the tribunal and the patrolling naval States to provide a legal basis for the transfer of suspected pirates, the transfer of evidence, and also for the protection of the rights of the detainees.

96. Unless the United Nations is prepared to establish a United Nations-assisted tribunal for an indefinite period, a completion and residual strategy would be needed at some stage, including the establishment of a residual mechanism to carry out the residual functions of the tribunal after its closure.

### Option 7: The establishment of an international tribunal by Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations

97. For the Security Council to establish an international tribunal as a subsidiary body would require a resolution or resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. A preliminary question for the Security Council to consider, therefore, would be whether acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region such that the Council would be acting under Chapter VII. The existing Security Council resolutions[46] determine that the situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to international peace and security in the region, and that incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea exacerbate that situation.

**Advantages and disadvantages**

98. If the Security Council does act under Chapter VII to establish a tribunal, it would be entirely international, with all of its judges, prosecutors and staff selected by the United Nations. However, the tribunal might nevertheless serve a capacity-building function if at least some of the United Nations selected judges, prosecutors and staff were from the region. Ideally, this would include Somali nationals. It would be beneficial for the tribunal to draw on the expertise built up, for example, in Kenya and Seychelles, but recruitment from those jurisdictions may have the disadvantage of inhibiting their capacity to prosecute nationally. In addition, it would be advantageous if the international tribunal were located in the region in order to take advantage of proximity for the purpose of the transfer of apprehended suspects by patrolling naval States, and the transfer of those convicted to third States for imprisonment.

[46] Most recently Security Council resolution 1897 (2009).

99. It would fall to the Security Council to negotiate and adopt a statute governing the tribunal's jurisdiction, including the crimes. The crime of piracy is well established under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and customary international law and should not present a difficulty of definition. However, if the jurisdiction were to include crimes of financing and organizing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, which are not established under the Convention, definitions would need to be negotiated by the Security Council. The geographic limits of the tribunal's jurisdiction, and whether the territorial seas of the regional States, including Somalia, should be within the jurisdiction or not, would have to be determined. As the Council would be acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, it would be able to determine these matters.

100. The temporal limits of the tribunal's jurisdiction would need to be decided, and whether this jurisdiction should extend to all persons committing piracy and armed robbery at sea, or whether it should be restricted to a category of the "most responsible", e.g., those who finance or plan acts of piracy. A related question would be whether, if the jurisdiction is not so restricted, the tribunal should be obliged to accept all transfers of suspects apprehended by patrolling naval States. Compared to a special chamber within a national jurisdiction, an international tribunal under Chapter VII of the Charter would be likely to have greater human and financial resources, and therefore capacity, to prosecute potentially large numbers of suspects.

101. The option of an international tribunal established by the Security Council is not likely to be among the most cost-effective. As a new judicial mechanism, it would require premises, and may incur other such costs that a special chamber within a national jurisdiction may not have. In addition, as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council, it would be required to follow the United Nations common system for staffing and salaries. The total cost would be likely to exceed the costs of a special chamber in a national jurisdiction in the region. The resource implications of the Council establishing a tribunal under Chapter VII would fall to the General Assembly to consider.

102. Security Council action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations may have the advantage of moving rapidly to the establishment of an international tribunal. However, an assessment of the overall time required in connection with this option would include the time necessary to identify and negotiate with a potential host State.

**Cooperation and residual issues**

103. The international tribunal would need to enter into agreements for the enforcement of sentences with third States. It would remain to be determined whether the international tribunal should enter into transfer agreements with the patrolling naval States, or whether the Security Council would wish to determine this matter in its resolution under Chapter VII.

104. Unless the Security Council intends to establish a permanent international tribunal, at some stage it would require a completion and residual strategy. A residual mechanism would have to be established to carry out the residual functions following the closure of the tribunal.

### C. Further options raised by members of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia

105. Further options have been raised by members of the Contact Group, but have been considered not to be feasible. The possibility of amending the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to include the crime of piracy was raised in Working Group 2, but was considered not to be feasible. It is notable that such amendment was not taken up during the first Review Conference of the Rome Statute, which took place in June 2010, in Kampala.

106. Possible amendment of the statute of the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea was also discussed in Working Group 2 on legal issues of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. It is a tribunal established under the Convention, which determines disputes among States arising out of the Convention. As the Convention is a multilateral Convention that took many years to negotiate and to enter into force, amendment was considered not to be feasible.

107. Amendment of the statute of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights,[47] located in Arusha, Tanzania, was also raised as a possibility. It is a court that determines African Union States' compliance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. To modify its jurisdiction so that it would be able to prosecute acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia would of course require substantial amendment of the treaty basis of the Court by its States parties. This would be a matter for the States of the African Union to consider. It is not apparent that any discussions are ongoing among the States of the region, nor among African States more broadly, to consider such amendment.

## VI. Conclusion

108. The Security Council requested the Secretary-General to present a report on possible options to further the aim of prosecuting and imprisoning persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, including, in particular, options for creating special domestic chambers, possibly with international components, a regional tribunal or an international tribunal and corresponding imprisonment arrangements, taking into account the work of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, the existing practice in establishing international and mixed tribunals, and the time and resources necessary to achieve and sustain substantive results.

109. In response, the Secretary-General has identified seven options for the Security Council to consider. In the absence of a potential host State, these options have been analysed in terms of general considerations that apply. The work of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, the existing practice in establishing tribunals, and the time and resources necessary, have also been taken into account.

110. A potential host State would need to be identified for any of the possible new judicial mechanisms. It would be necessary to determine the preferences of that potential host State, including whether it would accept international participation in

[47] It commenced functioning on 25 January 2004 with the ratification by 15 member States of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.

such a mechanism, and, if so, in what form. The need for sufficient arrangements for imprisonment in the region, ideally in Somalia, is as critical as the options for prosecution. This is particularly so given the large numbers of suspects apprehended by naval States. A new judicial mechanism to address piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia would be addressing a different situation to that addressed by the existing United Nations and United Nations-assisted tribunals. Such a mechanism would face ongoing criminal activity and, potentially, a large caseload, with no predictable completion date.

111. Whichever of the options may be favoured by the Security Council, assisting Somalia and its regions in the longer term to develop the capacity to prosecute and imprison to international standards will be essential in sustaining results in the fight against impunity for those responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia.

# Annex I

## Existing practice of the United Nations in establishing and participating in United Nations and United Nations-assisted tribunals, and the experience of other relevant judicial mechanisms

1. The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) are subsidiary organs of the Security Council, and therefore are United Nations tribunals. The following are the United Nations-assisted tribunals: the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which are independent international courts with important elements of national participation; and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, which forms part of the national court structure of Cambodia, but has important elements of United Nations participation.

2. The other relevant judicial mechanisms discussed below are the special panels in East Timor, the trial panels in Kosovo, the War Crimes Chamber of the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Lockerbie court. International participation in the panels in East Timor and Kosovo was legislated for by the United Nations administrations that had legislative and executive authority for those territories — the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The Bosnia War Crimes Chamber is a special chamber within the national jurisdiction of Bosnia, established by national law. The Lockerbie court is discussed because of its relevance as an example of a national court sitting in the territory of a third State.

### A. Why were the existing tribunals and other judicial mechanisms established?

3. The particular circumstances vary, but each of the United Nations and United Nations-assisted tribunals was established as a temporary measure in a situation where the State or States concerned have been unable or unwilling to conduct trials themselves for reasons connected with recent armed conflict or with terrorist acts. These tribunals were established to achieve accountability for serious international crimes committed during the conflicts, or for terrorist acts, that were at the heart of the situation in the affected States, which rendered them unable or unwilling to prosecute. Each tribunal has the purpose of achieving accountability for these acts, but also a broader purpose of contributing to peace and stability, and national reconciliation in the State concerned. In the case of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, both located within the country concerned, the relevant resolutions state that the purpose for establishment also includes the strengthening of the national judicial system.

4. International participation in the trial panels in East Timor and Kosovo was introduced to enable the prosecution to meet international standards of serious international crimes that had taken place during the conflicts there. The panels were established soon after the end of the conflicts, in circumstances where the domestic judicial systems were severely depleted, lacked capacity to deal with serious international crimes, and were perceived not to be independent. Building capacity

was one of the principal aims. The establishment of the Bosnia War Crimes Chamber was also intended primarily to provide the national judiciary with the capacity to conduct trials of serious international crimes according to international standards. A very large number of serious international crimes had been committed in Bosnia during the inter-ethnic conflicts there, which the State was unable to prosecute in the situation pertaining post-conflict. It would not have been feasible for ICTY to conduct prosecutions of all such cases, and so the Bosnia War Crimes Chamber was conceived as a part of the ICTY completion strategy some 10 years after the conflicts had ended. The aim was to build the capacity of judges, prosecutors and staff. International participation is being phased out over time.

5. The Lockerbie court was a Scottish court sitting in the territory of the Netherlands in order to provide a "neutral" location for the trial of the two Libyan defendants. It was therefore quite different to the other judicial mechanisms discussed above, but is included in this report as an example of a national court sitting in the territory of a third State.

## B. United Nations and United Nations-assisted tribunals

### 1. International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

6. ICTY and ICTR were established directly by the Security Council, and their statutes adopted, in resolutions[1] under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Their judges are elected by the General Assembly from a list submitted by the Security Council.[2] The Prosecutor of each is appointed by the Security Council upon nomination by the Secretary-General. Unlike the United Nations-assisted tribunals, the resolutions and the statutes do not make any special provision for participation by the affected States. ICTY and ICTR are in this sense entirely international tribunals.[3]

7. ICTY and ICTR each have limited territorial and temporal jurisdiction. ICTY has jurisdiction over persons responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes,[4] committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. It has concurrent jurisdiction with national courts, but may assert primacy. It has indicted 161 individuals. In practice, there will be no further indictments for these crimes because ICTY is pursuing its completion strategy.[5] ICTR has jurisdiction over persons responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes[6] committed in the territory of Rwanda, and over Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994. ICTR also has primacy over national courts. It has

[1] See Security Council resolution 827 (1993) for ICTY, and Security Council resolution 955 (1994) for ICTR.

[2] Although in recent years, as the tribunals approach their completion, the judges' terms have been extended by the Security Council and the General Assembly without elections being held.

[3] Although in practice there are nationals of the affected States working in both tribunals.

[4] Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and violations of the laws or customs of war.

[5] See Security Council resolutions 1503 (2003) and 1534 (2004).

[6] Violations of art. 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and of Additional Protocol II thereto of 1977.

indicted 92 individuals. It is also pursuing its completion strategy, and will issue no further indictments for these crimes. Since 2004, ICTY and ICTR have been directed to concentrate their efforts on the senior leaders suspected of being most responsible for crimes within their jurisdiction, with a view to the referral of accused not bearing this level of responsibility to competent national jurisdictions.[7] In practice, therefore, prosecutions are concentrating on the military or political leaders who planned or ordered crimes to be committed, rather than on those who committed offences on the ground.

### 2. Special Court for Sierra Leone

8. The Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone[8] was negotiated at the request of the Security Council.[9] The Special Court for Sierra Leone has limited territorial, temporal and personal jurisdiction. It is limited to persons who bear the greatest responsibility for the crimes set out in its statute, committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996. The crimes set out in the statute include crimes under international law and under Sierra Leonean law: crimes against humanity, war crimes,[10] and offences against young girls, owing to the prevalence of child soldiers in the conflict in Sierra Leone, the Special Court for Sierra Leone statute makes specific provision for their treatment.[11] The Special Court for Sierra Leone has concurrent jurisdiction with the national courts of Sierra Leone, but as with ICTY and ICTR, it has primacy. It has indicted 13 individuals. As with ICTY and ICTR, the requirement to prosecute those who bear the greatest responsibility has meant that prosecutions have concentrated on military and political leaders who planned or ordered crimes to be committed.[12] In practice there will be no further indictments for the above crimes because the Special Court for Sierra Leone is also pursuing its completion strategy. It is probably conducting its final trial, that of Charles Taylor, the former President of Liberia.[13]

9. The Special Court for Sierra Leone Trial and Appeals Chambers comprise a majority of judges appointed by the Secretary-General and a minority appointed by the Government of Sierra Leone. The Secretary-General appoints the Prosecutor,

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[7] See Security Council resolution 1534 (2004); under both statutes, criminal responsibility extends to those who planned, instigated, ordered, or aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of the crimes.

[8] Done at Freetown on 16 January 2002.

[9] See Security Council resolution 1315 (2000).

[10] Violations of art. 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II, thereto of 1977, other serious violations of international humanitarian law.

[11] See art. 7 of the statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone; the Court has no jurisdiction over anyone who was under the age of 15 at the time of alleged commission of the offences in question. Those who were between 15 and 18 years of age at the time of the alleged commission of offences are to be treated with dignity and a sense of worth, and in accordance with international human rights standards, in particular the rights of the child. Account must be taken of the desirability of promoting rehabilitation, reintegration and the assumption of a constructive role in society. Convicted juveniles are not subject to imprisonment, but may receive care or supervision orders, community service, counselling, foster care, training programmes, approved school, and programmes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration into society.

[12] Criminal responsibility extends to those who planned, ordered, instigated or aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of the crimes.

[13] Although there is an outstanding indictment in respect of Jonny Paul Koroma, he is suspected to be dead.

and the Government of Sierra Leone appoints a Sierra Leonean Deputy Prosecutor. Provision is made in the Agreement for consultation between the Secretary-General and the Government of Sierra Leone on all of these appointments.

### 3. Special Tribunal for Lebanon

10. The Agreement between the United Nations and the Lebanese Republic on the establishment of the Special Tribunal was negotiated at the request of the Security Council.[14] Following obstacles in the constitutional process for its ratification by the Lebanese Parliament, and in response to a request from the Prime Minister of Lebanon, the Security Council acted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to bring its provisions into force.[15]

11. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon has jurisdiction over persons responsible for the attack of 14 February 2005 that resulted in the death of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and in the death or injury of 22 others. The Tribunal may also have jurisdiction over persons responsible for related attacks, subject to certain conditions. It is unique among the United Nations and United Nations-assisted tribunals in that the applicable law is stated to be Lebanese criminal law, not any provisions of international law.[16] The Tribunal and the national courts of Lebanon have concurrent jurisdiction, but the Tribunal has primacy. It has not issued any indictments to date. As with the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the international judges are in the majority in each of the chambers of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. All judges are appointed by the Secretary-General, but the Lebanese judges are appointed by him from a list of 12 presented by the Government of Lebanon on the proposal of the Lebanese Supreme Council of the Judiciary. The Secretary-General appoints the Prosecutor, and the Government of Lebanon appoints a Lebanese Deputy Prosecutor. Unlike any of the other United Nations and United Nations-assisted tribunals, the Defence Office is also an organ of the Tribunal. The Head of the Defence Office is appointed by the Secretary-General. There is provision in the Agreement for consultation between the Secretary-General and the Government on all of these appointments.

### 4. Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia

12. The Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia concerning the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia[17] was negotiated at the request of the General Assembly.[18] Unlike the other United Nations and United Nations-assisted tribunals, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia forms part of the national court structure. It is a Cambodian national court, based on the French civil law system, with a special jurisdiction, and

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[14] See Security Council resolution 1664 (2006).

[15] See Security Council resolution 1757 (2007).

[16] See art. 2 of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon statute. The offences extend to those who participate as an accomplice, organize or direct others to commit the crimes, or contribute in any other way to their commission by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Superiors in a chain of command may also be criminally responsible where they fail to take all necessary and reasonable measures within their power to prevent them.

[17] The Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, done at Phnom Penh on 6 June 2003.

[18] See General Assembly resolution 57/228 A and 57/228 B.

with United Nations participation. It is an example of a special chamber within a national jurisdiction.

13. The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia was established by a provision of Cambodian national law that specifies that it will come to an end when it has carried out its mandate. It applies a mixture of international and Cambodian law. Its jurisdiction is limited to the senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea, and those most responsible, for genocide, crimes against humanity, and grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and various crimes under the Cambodian Penal Code, including homicide, torture, religious persecution and the destruction of cultural property. The temporal limit of its jurisdiction is the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979. Its rules of procedure are those of Cambodian law, with some adjustments to ensure consistency with international standards. There is no question of concurrent jurisdiction or primacy over national courts because the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia is a national court of Cambodia. In practice, the limited jurisdiction means that the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia is likely to try around 10 individuals considered to be senior leaders and those most responsible for the crimes within its jurisdiction, who in practice are political or military leaders who allegedly planned or ordered the commission of the crimes. To date, it has indicted five individuals.

14. All of the judges are appointed by the Cambodian Supreme Council of the Magistracy, although the international judges are nominated by the Secretary-General. Unlike the other United Nations-assisted tribunals, the international judges are in the minority in each of the chambers of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. There are two co-investigating judges, one international and one national; and two co-prosecutors, one international and one Cambodian. Concerns about the adequacy of the provisions for international participation led the then-United Nations Legal Counsel to withdraw from the negotiations with the Government of Cambodia in 2002, which led to the General Assembly requesting in early 2003 that negotiations resume without delay.[19] The concern is dealt with in the Agreement through the so-called "super majority" decision-making rule.[20] In effect, this means that in circumstances where the judges' views divide along national and international lines, the national judges would require an affirmative vote of at least one of the international judges to carry the decision.

15. Uniquely for a United Nations or United Nations-assisted tribunal, participation in the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia by the United Nations is run as a technical assistance project, through the United Nations Assistance to the Khmer Rouge Trials (UNAKRT), which forms the international component of the Administration of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. The Director of Administration is Cambodian, and the Deputy Director is international and is the most senior UNAKRT official. In this sense, the Administration of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia is "double-headed", as is the Office of the Co-Investigating Judges and the Office of the Co-Prosecutors. This inevitably presents challenges in terms of efficiency, and differences of approach and emphasis, but also offers great opportunities for capacity-building and a genuine interchange of views and ideas.

[19] See General Assembly resolution 57/228.

[20] See art. 4 of the Agreement.

## C. Special Panels established in East Timor and Kosovo, the Bosnia War Crimes Chamber, and the Lockerbie court

### 1. Special Panels for serious crimes in East Timor

16. Following a failed proposal to establish an international tribunal for crimes committed in East Timor in 1999, UNTAET established Special Panels within the domestic District Court and Court of Appeals in Dili to try those responsible for serious international crimes, and selected common crimes, which took place in East Timor since January 1999. UNTAET derived its authority from Security Council resolution 1272 (1999) of 25 October 1999, adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. It was endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice. As such, the United Nations was able to legislate for international participation in East Timor's domestic jurisdiction without the need for an agreement to be negotiated between the United Nations and the East Timor authorities.

17. The Special Panels were established to address a severely depleted judicial system, in which there was an absence of adequate criminal legislation, court infrastructure, trained judges, prosecutors, and court administrators. The Special Panels consisted of two Trial Panels and one Appeals Panel, each composed of two international judges and one East Timorese judge. In cases of special importance or gravity, Special Panels composed of three international judges and two East Timorese judges could be established in the Appeals Court. A Transitional Judicial Service Commission composed of three East Timorese and two international members recommended candidates for the Special Panels positions to the Transitional Administrator, who made appointments. From 2000, a public prosecution service was established with an international Deputy General Prosecutor. The administrative support system of the Special Panels was headed by the Judge Coordinator, an international staff member. Security Council resolution 1543 (2004) determined that 10 priority cases should be focused on, and that trials and other activities should be concluded as soon as possible, and no later than 20 May 2005. By that date, in the space of five years, 391 persons were indicted, and 55 trials were conducted involving 87 defendants.

### 2. UNMIK trial panels

18. A proposal to establish a Kosovo War and Ethnic Crimes Court, an ad hoc tribunal sitting in Kosovo, modelled on ICTY, was abandoned in September 2000 because Member States became increasingly concerned about the cost of a free-standing court, and feared that it would not be possible to provide the necessary security in Kosovo. From 2000, under the authority of UNMIK, international judges were deployed to trial panels in Kosovo's courts, and prosecutors were deployed to Kosovo's public prosecutors' offices, with the aim of strengthening the independence of the judiciary and the proper administration of justice. An exodus of judges and legal professionals during the conflict in Kosovo had left an inexperienced judicial system, about which concerns were raised of ethnic bias. The international judges and prosecutors focused on cases involving war crimes, inter-ethnic violence, and other serious crimes. Authority for these deployments derived from Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999, adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, which authorized the

Secretary-General to establish an interim administration for Kosovo with legislative and executive powers. As the interim administration, the United Nations was able to legislate for this international participation in Kosovo's domestic jurisdiction without the need for an agreement to be negotiated between the United Nations and the Kosovo authorities.

19. The early experience of these deployments of international judges and prosecutors to trial panels within Kosovo was not encouraging in terms of their impact on the proper administration of justice. The fact that the international judges were in the minority in the trial panels was regarded as leading to their having marginal influence on the judicial process and standards of justice. UNMIK therefore amended its legislation to enable at least two international judges to sit in three judge trial panels where necessary. These international panels in practice became the norm, and the earlier panels with a majority of national judges were abandoned. In March 2003, a Criminal Division within UNMIK was established that was composed exclusively of international prosecutors and international lawyers supporting the prosecutors, which worked in parallel with domestic prosecutorial services. International participation in trials continues to this date, and, since January 2009, UNMIK has handed responsibility for this to the European Union.

### 3. War Crimes Chamber in the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina

20. The War Crimes Chamber of the State Court of Bosnia is a further example of a special chamber within the national jurisdiction of a State, with international participation, although not United Nations participation. Security Council resolution 1503 (2003) of 28 August 2003 provided that an essential prerequisite for achieving the objectives of the ICTY completion strategy was the establishment of a special chamber within the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina to receive cases referred from ICTY against lower or intermediate rank accused. The Bosnia War Crimes Chamber was established in 2003 by national legislation, with the intention that its international components would be phased out and ultimately become national. It began functioning in 2005, and as a national court will continue indefinitely, including after the international components are phased out.

21. The Bosnia War Crimes Chamber is composed of six Trial Panels and two Appellate Panels. Initially, each Panel was composed of two international judges and one national judge, with the national judges presiding. Since January 2008, most of the Panels dealing with war crimes have reversed this composition so that there are two national judges and one international judge. The goal is to change the composition of all trial and appellate Panels in this fashion. There are both national and international prosecutors working within the Special Department for War Crimes, which is within the State Prosecutor's Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Registry for War Crimes, which provides administrative, financial and logistical support, and coordinates the activities of the State Court, also consists of national and international staff. The Criminal Defence Office is staffed by nationals and headed by an international Director. It keeps a roster of defence lawyers, organizes their training, and provides for legal advice, research, and support.

22. Initially, the international judges and prosecutors were appointed by the European Union High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since 2006, appointments have been made nationally by the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina in coordination with the President of the State

Court and the Chief Prosecutor. The international judges are seconded by their Governments, and are given short-term, renewable contracts, usually for one or two years.

23. The applicable substantive and procedural law is national. The Bosnia War Crimes Chamber has jurisdiction over four categories of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide cases. Jurisdiction is limited to offences committed within Bosnia and Herzegovina, and include indictments referred from ICTY in accordance with Rule 11 bis of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence (i.e., the accused not meeting the threshold of being senior leaders most responsible), other cases investigated but not indicted by the ICTY Prosecutor, and cases investigated nationally by the Bosnian authorities. The Bosnia War Crimes Chamber deals with a very high volume of cases. As of 30 April 2010, there were 439 cases before the Bosnia War Crimes Chamber. It has been estimated that around 6,000 accused fall within its jurisdiction in total.

### 4. The Lockerbie court

24. The Lockerbie court was the Scottish High Court of Justiciary, which sat at Camp Zeist, part of the decommissioned United States Soesterberg Air Base outside Utrecht in the Netherlands. It prosecuted two Libyan suspects accused of the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the Netherlands concluded an agreement regulating the sitting and functioning of the Lockerbie court in the Netherlands. Under the agreement, the Netherlands undertook to host the Lockerbie court and to provide premises for the trial, and the Lockerbie court was endowed with full juridical personality. The Netherlands allowed the detention of the accused within the premises of the Lockerbie court in accordance with Scots law and practice for the purposes of the trial, and, in the event of conviction, pending their transfer to the United Kingdom for imprisonment. The jurisdiction of the Lockerbie court was limited to the trial of the two accused. They were charged with the offences of conspiracy to murder, murder, and contravention of aviation security legislation in the United Kingdom. The applicable substantive and procedural law was Scots law. The United Kingdom bore all the costs relating to the establishment and sitting of the Lockerbie court in the Netherlands, and reimbursed all costs incurred by the host country.

## D. Practical considerations in the establishment and functioning of the United Nations and United Nations-assisted tribunals, and of other relevant judicial mechanisms

25. This section sets out various practical considerations that have arisen in relation to the establishment and functioning of the United Nations and United Nations-assisted tribunals, and other relevant judicial mechanisms discussed above.

#### Cooperation

26. A particularly important form of cooperation for each of the tribunals is the enforcement of sentences in third States. The United Nations and United Nations-assisted tribunals have detention facilities for suspects, but do not have prison facilities for those convicted. Further, the host States of these tribunals are generally

not prepared to enforce sentences. All of the United Nations and United Nations-assisted tribunals, with the exception of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, are therefore dependent on the willingness and ability of third States to enter into agreements with them on the enforcement of sentences. The existing tribunals have identified third States and negotiated these agreements after establishment, but are finding it increasingly difficult to do so. Moreover, such agreements concluded by existing tribunals do not oblige the third State to accept any particular convicted person, but only to consider the request. In practice, finding such third States willing and able to enter into such agreements, and able to provide prison conditions to international standards, has not proved easy. The tribunals also require cooperation from third States in order to enter into agreements on the relocation of witnesses, if this is necessary.

27. Each of the United Nations and United Nations-assisted tribunals is also heavily dependent on cooperation by States to be able to investigate and secure the arrest and transfer of indictees. All States have a legal obligation under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to cooperate with ICTY[21] and ICTR.[22] In relation to the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, each of the States concerned has an obligation to cooperate with the relevant tribunal under the provisions of its agreement with the United Nations.[23]

**Length of time needed for establishment and functioning of judicial mechanisms**

28. The length of time needed from the initial request or decision by a political organ of the United Nations to the establishment and subsequent functioning of the tribunals has varied, but it has generally been a matter of years, rather than weeks or months. The time periods for ICTY and ICTR were the shortest. Their statutes were drafted by the Secretary-General within periods of 60 days, and submitted to the Security Council in response to requests by the Council.[24] They each began functioning around one year later. For the Special Court for Sierra Leone, it took two years of negotiation from the initial request by the Security Council until the conclusion of the Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.[25] It commenced functioning in July 2002, some two years after the initial request.[26] For the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, it took six years from the initial request by the General Assembly until the conclusion of the Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia concerning the

[21] See Security Council resolution 827 (1993), and art. 29 of the ICTY statute.

[22] See Security Council resolution 955 (1994), and art. 28 of the ICTR statute.

[23] See art. 17 of the Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone; art. 15 of the Agreement between the United Nations and the Lebanese Republic on the establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon; and art. 25 of the Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia concerning the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.

[24] The Secretary-General was requested to prepare reports in Security Council resolutions 808 (1993) for ICTY and 935 (1994) for ICTR.

[25] From 2000 to 2002.

[26] The Secretary-General was requested to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone to create an independent special court in Security Council resolution 1315 (2000). The United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone concluded such an agreement on 16 January 2002.

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.[27] It started functioning on 11 September 2006, some nine years after the initial request by the General Assembly. The negotiation of the Agreement between the United Nations and the Lebanese Republic on the establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon took one year to negotiate.[28] It commenced functioning on 1 March 2009, some three years after the initial request by the Security Council.

**Composition of any new judicial mechanism**

29. The composition and status of each of the United Nations and United Nations-assisted tribunals varies. In each, the judges selected by the United Nations either comprise the entirety of the judges (ICTY and ICTR), or they are in the majority in the chambers to which they are assigned (Special Court for Sierra Leone and Special Tribunal for Lebanon). In the case of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, the "super majority" voting rule means that a decision cannot be taken without the support of at least one of the international judges. ICTY and ICTR, which are entirely international in nature, and which sit outside the affected countries, face a challenge in ensuring that they leave a strong legacy of an enhanced capacity to prosecute serious international crimes, and a strengthened rule of law in the affected countries. Experience from the Bosnia War Crimes Chamber demonstrates that, in a national judicial system that has had time to recover from conflict, a well-planned comprehensive approach of capacity-building of the national system, combined with international participation in each of the organs of the court, can be successful. It can enable a gradual move to national ownership through national judges being in the majority in the chambers, and then to a phasing out of the international components altogether over time. Conversely, international participation in trial panels in Kosovo, introduced soon after the conflict was over, when the judicial system was barely functioning and international judges were not in the majority in trial panels, was seen as insufficient, and increased internationalization was regarded as necessary to improve the administration of justice.

**Jurisdiction**

30. The existing United Nations and United Nations-assisted tribunals have a limited temporal jurisdiction, and either a limited geographical jurisdiction, or a jurisdiction limited to specific events. Unlike the Bosnia War Crimes Chamber and other relevant judicial mechanisms, each of the United Nations and United Nations-assisted tribunals will indict only a limited number of individuals, primarily being

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[27] The General Assembly, by its resolution 56/169, urged the Cambodian Government and the United Nations to conclude an agreement without delay. Such an agreement was concluded on 6 June 2003. However, the General Assembly had been seized with this matter since June 1997, when the Cambodian Co-Prime Ministers requested United Nations assistance in organizing the process for the Khmer Rouge trials.

[28] The Security Council, in its resolution 1664 (2006), requested the Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Lebanon aimed at establishing a tribunal of an international character. The Agreement between the United Nations and the Lebanese Republic on the establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon was signed by the Government of Lebanon on 23 January 2007 and by the United Nations on 6 February 2007. The United Nations had been seized with this matter since April 2005, when the Security Council adopted resolution 1595 (2005), establishing an international independent investigation Commission on the death of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and the death or injury of 22 others.

those who are the senior leaders or those bearing most responsibility for the crimes within the jurisdiction. The personal jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is not limited to senior leaders and those most responsible, but the number of those involved in the attacks within (and potentially within) its jurisdiction are likely in practice to be limited. Each of the tribunals, except the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (which is a national court), has concurrent jurisdiction with national courts, but can assert primacy at any stage of national proceedings.

**Primacy or complementarity**

31. The relationship between international and national criminal jurisdiction can be organized either by giving concurrent jurisdiction, but with the right of the international tribunal to assert primacy over particular cases, or by the principle of complementarity. ICTY, ICTR, the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon all have concurrent jurisdiction with national courts, but may assert primacy. The right to assert primacy avoids simultaneous exercise of jurisdiction over an accused, which would be contrary to the principle of *non bis in idem*. ICC, a court established by a multilateral treaty, has jurisdiction based on the principle of complementarity. This principle means that it can only investigate and prosecute international crimes falling within its jurisdiction when national jurisdictions are unable or unwilling to do so. There is no question of primacy or complementarity in the case of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia because it is embedded in a national court of Cambodia.

**Financing**

32. The United Nations and the United Nations-assisted tribunals require significant financial support both at the commencement stage, and for their continued operations. The initial annual costs were: ICTY: $10.8 million; ICTR: $13.4 million; Special Court for Sierra Leone: approximately $19.4 million ($19,425,781); and Special Tribunal for Lebanon: $51.4 million. The initial costs for the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia were $100.4 million for the first four years; that is, from 2006 to 2009 (of which $78.7 million was for the international component, and $18.7 million was for the national component). The costs of each of these tribunals to date have peaked at the following amounts: ICTY: $376.2 million (for the biennium 2008-2009); ICTR: $292.9 million (for the biennium 2008-2009); Special Court for Sierra Leone: $36,124,200 (budget for 2008); Special Tribunal for Lebanon: $55,347,730 (budget for 2009); and Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia: $92.3 million (for the biennium 2010-2011, of which $69.1 million is for the international component and $23.2 million is for the national component). The current costs of these tribunals are: ICTY: $290.9 million (for the biennium 2010-2011); ICTR: $245.3 million (for the biennium 2010-2011); Special Court for Sierra Leone: $20,674,600 (budget for 2010); Special Tribunal for Lebanon: $55,347,730 (budget for 2010); and Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia: $92.3 million (for the biennium 2010-2011).

33. Funding for the Bosnia War Crimes Chamber and the Special Department for War Crimes is provided by the European Commission, the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and voluntary financing by States. Management of the Bosnia War Crimes Chamber is handled internally by a management committee, but funding oversight is provided by representatives of the Bosnian authorities and diplomatic

representatives of donor States in Sarajevo. The average annual cost of the Bosnia War Crimes Chamber from 2005 to 2009 was 13 million euros. The Bosnian Government is gradually assuming a greater proportion of the financing, and, in 2008, its contribution (8.6 million euros) exceeded international contributions (5.1 million euros) for the first time. The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina is expected to begin funding the Bosnian War Crimes Chamber and the prosecution department entirely from 2010.

34. The Special Panels in East Timor were funded through UNTAET and subsequently the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), which received both United Nations-assessed contributions and voluntary contributions from States. For the period from 2003 to 2005, the total operating cost of the Special Panels in East Timor was approximately $14.3 million. The financing of the Trial Panels in Kosovo, including of the international judges, was divided between the budget of UNMIK, which is financed from United Nations-assessed contributions, and the domestic budget of Kosovo. The salaries of the international prosecutors and administrative and other support staff (interpreters, court recorders and legal officers) came from the UNMIK budget.

35. ICTY and ICTR, as subsidiary organs of the Security Council, are funded from United Nations-assessed contributions. The United Nations-assisted tribunals are all financed from voluntary contributions.[29] In practice, this has proved to be a problematic basis for financing international justice. It has caused regular funding challenges and difficulties of forward planning. A relatively small number of States forms the principal donors to these tribunals, which therefore carry the bulk of the financial responsibility, and now do so in difficult economic times when there is competition for scarce resources.

**Oversight**

36. The oversight of the financing and non-judicial aspects of the work of the United Nations and United Nations-assisted tribunals at United Nations Headquarters also takes various forms. As ICTY and ICTR are funded through assessed contributions, they are under the financial control of the General Assembly, acting through its Fifth Committee. The Security Council, as their parent body, also plays an important role in considering matters such as any necessary amendments to their statutes, and extensions to the terms of office of the judges and the Prosecutors. All such matters are considered in detail at the working level by the Security Council Informal Working Group on International Tribunals, which, with the assistance of the Office of Legal Affairs, drafts all necessary resolutions for adoption by the Security Council. The Working Group is currently heavily engaged in considering the ICTY and ICTR completion strategies and the need for a future residual mechanism to continue certain essential functions of the tribunals after their closure.

37. The Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon have Management Committees comprising representatives from the Permanent Missions of the Governments that are the principal donors to the tribunal concerned. These Committees determine the tribunals' budgets, and provide policy direction and advice on all non-judicial aspects of the tribunals' operations. The Special Court for

[29] The financing of the national component of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia is the responsibility of the Royal Government of Cambodia, and 49 per cent of the financing of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is borne by the Government of Lebanon.

Sierra Leone Management Committee is also heavily engaged in consideration of the Court's completion strategy and the establishment of a future residual mechanism. The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia does not have a Management Committee, but has a Steering Committee that does not have budgetary authority. It also comprises representatives from the Permanent Missions of the Governments that are the principal donors, and it provides guidance on non-judicial matters. Budgetary authority lies with a broader grouping of interested States that meet infrequently. These Committees are advised and assisted in their relationship with the respective tribunals by the Office of Legal Affairs. Experience suggests that a strong link between the tribunal and an active management committee, with budgetary authority, provides the most efficient and effective means of budgetary oversight and policy guidance to the voluntarily funded tribunals and other judicial mechanisms.

**Completion and residual issues**

38. For all tribunals that are not of a permanent character, there will inevitably be a need to consider a strategy for the completion of the tribunal's work and for the carrying out of the residual functions following its closure. Such functions include the protection of witnesses, the monitoring of sentence enforcement, hearing applications for review of judgment, and the management of the archives. Depending on the circumstances, some tribunals also require the authority to try fugitives not brought to justice before closure. It is clear that some of these functions, e.g., the protection of witnesses and the monitoring of sentence enforcement, could potentially last for several decades. Establishing a tribunal requires sustained political and financial commitments going beyond the anticipated lifespan of the tribunal itself. For special chambers within the national jurisdiction of a State, the special chamber itself may or may not be indefinite, depending on the wishes of that State. A special chamber with a definite lifespan would face the same residual issues as a tribunal, and would equally require some form of residual mechanism to carry out the residual functions. A special chamber with an indefinite lifespan would not require a completion strategy or residual mechanism, but unless the United Nations is prepared to take on an open-ended commitment to its participation in any such chamber, its participation would at some point need to be brought to an end. In that circumstance, some form of continued United Nations presence may be necessary with a view to ensuring that residual functions are carried out by the national chamber to international standards.

# Annex II

## Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia

1. The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia was established on 14 January 2009 to facilitate discussion and coordination of actions among States and organizations to suppress piracy off the coast of Somalia. It was established after the Security Council, in its resolution 1851 (2008), encouraged "all States and regional organizations fighting piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia to establish an international cooperation mechanism to act as a common point of contact between and among States, regional and international organizations on all aspects of combating piracy and armed robbery at sea off Somalia's coast".

2. The Contact Group operates through four working groups: Working Group 1 (convened by the United Kingdom with the support of the International Maritime Organization (IMO)) addresses activities related to military and operational coordination and information sharing and the establishment of the regional coordination centre; Working Group 2 (convened by Denmark with the support of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)) addresses legal issues related to piracy; Working Group 3 (convened by the United States with the support of IMO) addresses shipping self-awareness and other capabilities; and Working Group 4 (convened by Egypt) works on improving diplomatic and public information efforts on all aspects of piracy.

### Consideration by the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia of national prosecutions, imprisonment by States and United Nations assistance

3. In the five meetings that have been held since January 2009, Working Group 2 of the Contact Group has addressed a number of important legal issues relevant to the efforts of States to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia. The main purpose of those discussions was to encourage the prosecution and the imprisonment of suspects within national legal systems. Issues such as the international legal framework applicable to piracy, national laws on piracy and armed robbery at sea, legal and practical challenges to national prosecutions, the apprehension and the detention of suspected pirates at sea, capacity-building, the use of force, and applicable human rights considerations were discussed. The discussions focused on being as practical as possible, and resulted in a "toolbox" of relevant resources and precedents that States and organizations may use to strengthen their capacity to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea.

4. UNODC prepared and circulated a report based on the responses to a questionnaire on legal and practical challenges to national piracy prosecutions. The report provides an analysis of the different legal elements that are needed, including the criminalization of piracy and armed robbery at sea or other relevant offences, the liability of persons for these offences in the case of participation or attempts, provisions establishing sufficient criminal jurisdiction to allow for the national prosecution of offences that happen on the high seas, and evidentiary and procedural requirements in national laws. All of these elements may impact on the apprehension and successful prosecution of suspects.

5. Working Group 2 has identified and addressed a series of impediments to national prosecutions of those suspected of piracy and armed robbery at sea, including legal and/or practical impediments for patrolling naval States. States

affected by piracy and armed robbery at sea, and States willing to prosecute suspected pirates. For example, practical tools, such as guidance regarding the collection and transfer of evidence by patrolling naval States, have been shared, and there have been discussions on how best to ensure that witnesses attend trials. INTERPOL has provided information on its efforts to ensure the collection and the dissemination of information. States that are currently prosecuting suspects report on progress in those cases, and any challenges they face.

6. The meetings have been used as a forum by States to urge other States to exercise their jurisdiction in cases where they have an interest, for example, where their flag vessel has been attacked, or their nationals are victims. The regional States' need for capacity-building has been a major element in discussions, and UNODC has briefed Working Group 2 extensively on its programme to support ongoing prosecutions, detention and imprisonment. IMO has briefed on its implementation of the Djibouti Code of Conduct. Other issues considered concern the use of force in a maritime law enforcement context, and the application of human rights obligations to the apprehension, the detention and the transfer of those suspected of piracy and armed robbery at sea.

**Consideration by the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia of possible judicial mechanisms**

7. The consideration of possible judicial mechanisms in Working Group 2 gave rise to a number of non-papers by States, to two informal meetings hosted by the Government of the Netherlands, and to a discussion paper prepared by the Chair of Working Group 2, which was considered by the Contact Group at its plenary meeting on 28 January 2010. In that meeting, the Chair noted that States and organizations continue to have different views on the need to establish any additional mechanism for prosecution, and stressed that Working Group 2 had agreed that the discussion regarding models for such mechanisms should be undertaken without prejudice to the position of States and organization on the need for any such mechanism. The Chair wrote to the Office of Legal Affairs on 9 June 2010, enclosing his conclusions of the Working Group 2 meetings, his discussion paper and the other relevant non-papers and documents.

8. The importance of the need to find a host State for any new judicial mechanism was underlined, as was the need for any such State to have arrangements with third States so that it does not become a "haven", but is able to repatriate or transfer to third States those persons who are acquitted, those serving sentences, and those who have served their sentences. It was noted that the crime of piracy is of a different nature and scope to the serious international crimes normally dealt with by international tribunals, and that suspected pirates brought before any such new international tribunal would be unlikely to meet the criterion of being the "most responsible" for the crimes in question, which is a threshold applied by most of the current international tribunals. There was broad agreement that it may not be viable to extend the competence of the International Criminal Court to include the crime of piracy, nor to amend the competence of the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea.

9. Three categories of possible models for a new judicial mechanism were identified: an international tribunal; a regional tribunal; and a tribunal based in the national jurisdiction of a State in the region. Under the first category, the possibilities identified were an international tribunal established pursuant to a Security Council

resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, or a "hybrid" tribunal following the model of the Special Court for Sierra Leone or the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, based on an agreement with the United Nations. Under the second category, the possibilities identified were a regional tribunal established through a multilateral agreement negotiated among the States of the region, or the use of an existing court, such as the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, located in Arusha, Tanzania. It was noted that the time required to negotiate the appropriate treaty basis for either of these options might be considerable. Under the third category, the possibilities identified were a Somali court located in a third State in the region, or a special piracy chamber within the national jurisdiction of a State in the region. It was recognized that the Somali court option would have the advantage of enabling Somalia to play a direct part in the solution to prosecuting acts of piracy. However, the fractured nature of the law on piracy in Somalia, and significant issues concerning Somali judicial and prosecutorial capacity, meant that this option may be unlikely to be viable at present.

10. The option of a specialized piracy chamber within the national jurisdiction of one or more States in the region, supported by financial or technical assistance by the international community, was considered to follow the precedent of the Bosnia War Crimes Chamber. The Chair noted in his conclusions of the meeting in November 2009 that this would be the most feasible model, depending on one or more regional States, including Somalia, being willing and able to undertake prosecutions when it becomes possible.

11. The Chair travelled to the region in November 2009 for consultations with States and organizations. There were differing views on the need to establish any new judicial mechanism. He did not receive a clear indication from any State of a willingness to host a new judicial mechanism. Regional States and organizations emphasized that the focus should be on supporting existing mechanisms through capacity-building or other assistance. The particular kind of support offered should depend on the needs of States in the region willing to prosecute, and should add value to the already existing mechanisms. The possibility for transferring prisoners from the prosecuting State for imprisonment in a third State would be one important way of burden-sharing.

**International Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia**

12. The International Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia was established on 27 January 2010 through endorsement by the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and the United Nations Controller. The overall purpose of the International Trust Fund is to support the implementation of the Member States' initiatives regarding combating piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia. It also provides a means to States and the shipping industry to make financial contributions.

13. The International Trust Fund has received $2,973,900 since its establishment, and has recommended the disbursement of $2,437,372 to fund a total of six projects supporting prosecution and detention-related activities in Kenya, Seychelles and Somalia, and a strategy to enable the Transitional Federal Government to raise awareness among Somali populations in general, and young people in particular, of the risks associated with involvement in piracy and other criminal activities.

United Nations S/2010/395

Security Council

Distr.: General
22 July 2010

Original: English

## Identical letters dated 21 July 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I write to you to draw your attention to a developing matter of concern in the Middle East that could affect the peace and security of the region.

At the Security Council meeting on 21 July 2010, members of the Council and the wider international community expressed concerns about the phenomenon of unauthorized vessels that seek to violate the existing naval blockade imposed on the Gaza Strip. Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe stated: "Such convoys are not helpful to resolving the basic economic problems of Gaza and needlessly carry the potential for escalation".

In defiance of these calls, it appears that two ships, *Junia* and *Julia*, plan to depart from Lebanon and sail to the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip. The stated intention of these vessels is to violate the existing naval blockade of Gaza.

Given the ongoing armed conflict between the Hamas terrorist organization and the State of Israel, compounded by the fact that these ships originate from Lebanon, which remains in a state of hostility with Israel, Israel reserves its right under international law to use all necessary means to prevent these ships from violating the aforementioned naval blockade. Furthermore, it cannot be ruled out that these vessels carry weapons or individuals with provocative and confrontational intentions.

In addition, I wish to highlight that all goods that are not weapons or materiel for war-like purposes are now entering the Gaza Strip through appropriate mechanisms that ensure their delivery as well as their civilian nature. The organizers of the aforementioned boats are fully aware of these internationally recognized and unimpeded channels to deliver aid to the Gaza Strip. However, the organizers, similar to previous attempts by others, seek to incite a confrontation and raise tension in our region.

In view of these circumstances, Israel calls upon the Government of Lebanon to demonstrate responsibility and to prevent these boats from departing to the Gaza Strip. Such action will prevent any possible escalation. Israel further calls upon the international community to exercise its influence in order to prevent these boats from departing and to discourage their nationals from taking part in such actions.

10-46147 (E) 230710

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I should be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Gabriela **Shalev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2010/396

Security Council

Distr.: General
22 July 2010

Original: English

**Letter dated 15 July 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council**

I have the honour to transmit herewith a report on the work of the Security Council during the presidency of Lebanon in May 2010 (see annex). The document was prepared under my own responsibility, following consultations with other members of the Security Council.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nawaf **Salam**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

10-46134 (E) 020810

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# Annex to the letter dated 15 July 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

## Assessment of the work of the Security Council during the presidency of Lebanon (May 2010)

### Introduction

Lebanon assumed the presidency of the Security Council in May 2010, during which month the Council engaged in a constructive and comprehensive programme of work that addressed a range of regional and thematic issues. The regional issues included: Chad/Central African Republic, Nepal, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Sudan/Darfur, Djibouti, Côte d'Ivoire, Nepal, the Middle East including the Palestinian question, Iraq, Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The thematic topics comprised: cooperation between the United Nations and the regional and subregional organizations (European Union); the counter-terrorism Committees: the Committees established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004); United Nations peacekeeping operations; intercultural dialogue for peace and security; and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006).

During the month, the Council held nine consultations, nine briefings, one private meeting, one open debate and three debates. The Council issued two statements to the press and adopted five resolutions on the extension of mandates of United Nations peacekeeping missions.

On 4 May the Council held consultations and adopted the programme of work for May 2010. During those consultations, under "any other business", Ambassador Claude Heller of Mexico briefed the Council about the 2010 review of the Peacebuilding Commission, in his capacity as co-facilitator mandated by the Security Council. He gave a recount of the activities undertaken by the co-facilitators during the month of April, including field trips to Europe and Africa. He also reminded Council members that the second session of open-ended consultations had been convened by the co-facilitators for 10 May 2010.

After consultations, the President of the Security Council gave a briefing for States not members of the Council and for the press about the programme of work of the Council for May 2010.

The Council observed a minute of silence at the beginning of its meetings on 7 and 10 May, in tribute to the late President of Nigeria Umaru Musa Yar'Adua.

### Africa

#### Chad/Central African Republic and the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad

On 5 May, Council members held an interactive discussion and exchanged views on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Youssef Mahmoud, the Permanent Representative of Chad, Ambassador Ahmad Allam-mi,

and the Permanent Representative of the Central African Republic, Ambassador Fernand Poukre-Kono.

Also on 5 May, the Council held a private meeting with the countries contributing troops and police to MINURCAT. During the meeting, Council members exchanged views with the Special Representative and the representatives of contributing countries.

On 7 May, in consultations of the whole, the Special Representative briefed the Council on the security and humanitarian situation in Chad and the Central African Republic, and on the ongoing discussions between MINURCAT and the Governments of the two countries regarding the drawdown of the military component of MINURCAT. Council members held intensive discussions concerning the MINURCAT mandate, which was set to expire on 15 May, and some expressed concerns about the drawdown.

On 12 May, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1922 (2010), by which it extended the mandate of MINURCAT for two weeks, until 26 May, while it considered thoroughly the recommendations for a revised mandate.

On 20 May, the Council held another interactive discussion, during which Council members exchanged views with the Special Representative of the President of Chad to MINURCAT, General Oki Dagache, about the Chadian strategy to ensure the security of civilians in the east of the country.

On 25 May, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1923 (2010), by which it decided to extend the mandate of MINURCAT until 31 December 2010 and to reduce the military component of MINURCAT to 2,200 military personnel (1,900 in Chad and 300 in the Central African Republic).

### Burundi and the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi

On 10 May, the Council heard a briefing by the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General for Burundi and Head of the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), Charles Petrie, on the preparations for the forthcoming elections there. The Deputy Permanent Representative of Switzerland, Heidi Grau, spoke on behalf of the Chairman of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission. The Permanent Representative of Burundi, Zacharie Gahutu, also spoke about the preparations for the upcoming elections.

In the consultations of the whole which followed, Council members expressed their views on the progress achieved, welcomed the recent developments in Burundi and commended the important role of BINUB in supporting the electoral cycle. After the consultations, the President made a statement to the press in which the Council welcomed the appointment of the new Executive Representative of the Secretary-General and reaffirmed its support for BINUB.

### Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

On 10 May, the Council held consultations on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, during which the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, and Emergency Relief Coordinator John Holmes, briefed the Council on his recent trip to the country.

On 13 May, a Security Council mission led by the Permanent Representative of France, Gérard Araud, travelled to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The mission returned on 16 May.

On 19 May, Ambassador Araud briefed the Council about the mission and the meetings held with President Joseph Kabila, the Congolese authorities and representatives of international non-governmental organizations and various national civil society groups. He stressed that in any decision on the future presence of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) the Council should consider preventing new outbreaks of instability, and he noted the particular priority of security sector reform. He said that one of the lessons drawn from the numerous meetings during the mission was that the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo had evolved in a positive, albeit fragile, way. He added that the humanitarian and human rights situations were troublesome and that it was important to bring the perpetrators of sexual violence to justice.

On 27 May, in consultations of the whole, the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ambassador Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti of Brazil, addressed the Council and presented the interim report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The Chair reported on the violations of sanctions referred to in the report, which had been committed by foreign armed groups, notably the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), the Rally for Unity and Democracy (RUD) and the Lord's Resistance Army, and by Congolese armed groups, which continued to pose serious threats to the security of the population in the Kivus and in Maniema and Oriental Provinces. There had been similar violations of the sanctions by the extensive local, regional and international support networks which provided political and material support to FDLR and RUD/Congrès national pour la démocratie. The Chair also reported on the appearance before the Committee of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and on the progress made by the Group of Experts in developing due diligence standards for commercial actors involved in the Democratic Republic of the Congo mineral trade.

In the discussions that followed, Council members expressed their appreciation of the Group's work and noted the reported violations with concern.

On 28 May, the Council adopted resolution 1925 (2010), by which it extended the mandate of MONUC until 30 June 2010 and authorized the withdrawal of up to 2,000 United Nations military personnel by that date. Moreover, in view of the new phase that had been reached in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council decided that MONUC should, as from 1 July 2010, be renamed the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). The Council authorized MONUSCO to be deployed until 30 June 2011 and to comprise a maximum of 19,815 military personnel, 760 military observers, 391 police personnel and 1,050 personnel of formed police units.

**Somalia**

On 12 May, the Council held a debate on the situation in Somalia in which the First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources of Somalia, Abdurahman Ibrahim, participated and made a statement. During the

meeting, the Council was briefed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, on the situation there. The Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union Commission, Ramtane Lamamra, the acting head of the delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, Pedro Serrano, and the Permanent Representative of Norway, Ambassador Morten Wetland, also made statements.

The Special Representative reminded the Council of the need for simultaneous action in the political, security and development fields, noting the "horrendous" humanitarian situation in Somalia. He stressed that the upcoming Istanbul Conference on Somalia was timely and would address security issues and provide a platform for the Somali private sector. He explained that the international community could help the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by providing equipment and salaries for its trained forces. On piracy, he praised the Transitional Federal Government's memorandum of understanding with Puntland. He called for empowering the Transitional Federal Government and putting the revenue from fishing licensing fees into an escrow account for use by the authorities. He reiterated that the international community must move to Mogadishu to make a difference.

The First Deputy Prime Minister of Somalia told the Council that the efforts of his Government were being hampered by a group of terrorists with links to Al-Qaida. He called for the deployment of the remaining AMISOM peacekeepers and expressed the view that a United Nations force would contribute to the stabilization of Somalia. He also cited recent political and security gains, including the cooperation agreement of 15 March with Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a.

In the debate that followed, Council members expressed their concern about the security situation in Somalia, supported the reconciliation efforts of the Transitional Federal Government, welcomed the convening of the Istanbul Conference and reaffirmed their support for the work of AMISOM.

**Sudan and the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur**

On 7 May, the President made a statement on behalf of the Council, condemning in the strongest terms the attacks in Darfur on that day on peacekeepers of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The attacks had left two Egyptian soldiers dead and three others seriously wounded. The Council also reiterated its full support for UNAMID and expressed its condolences to the families of those killed in the attacks and to the Government of Egypt. The Council members encouraged the Government of the Sudan to bring all the perpetrators to justice.

On 20 May, the Council was briefed by the joint African Union-United Nations Special Representative for Darfur, Ibrahim Gambari, who introduced the Secretary-General's latest report on UNAMID (S/2010/213). He spoke about the political process in Darfur, the security and humanitarian situation, and the status of compliance by all parties with their international obligations. He also delineated recent developments, including the approaching full deployment of UNAMID, the progress in the negotiations in Doha, the improved relations between the Sudan and Chad, and the election process.

In addition, the Special Representative referred to the difficulties UNAMID was facing in carrying out its mandate. He said that the ability of UNAMID to protect civilians in danger was severely constrained, since the Government of the Sudan and other Darfurian parties continued to deny UNAMID access to the areas under their control. The situation had been exacerbated by the abduction of four UNAMID police advisers on 11 April and the deliberate attacks on UNAMID, which had led to fatalities among its ranks.

In the consultations of the whole that followed, Council members discussed the latest developments in Darfur, expressed their strong support for UNAMID and discussed the importance of the protection of civilians.

### Peace and security in Africa: Djibouti

On 19 May, the Council held a briefing about peace and security in Africa in connection with Djibouti. The President of Djibouti, Ismail Omar Guelleh, addressed the Council. He stated that the many problems which the Horn of Africa faced, including the breakdown of law and order, food insecurity, the conflict in Somalia and the destabilizing actions of Eritrea, could bring about greater crises in the Horn and could be a prelude to a much worse situation, unless their many causes were sufficiently and seriously addressed. He also enumerated his country's contributions to peace and anti-piracy efforts in Somalia, as well as pending issues between Djibouti and Eritrea.

Following President Guelleh's briefing, Council members commended the contributions of Djibouti to peace and anti-piracy efforts in Somalia and its abidance by Security Council resolutions pertaining to its border conflict with Eritrea. Council members urged Eritrea to respect resolution 1907 (2009) and emphasized the importance of dialogue for resolving the pending issues in the region, inter alia, counter-terrorism, anti-piracy, humanitarian issues and the border problems with Eritrea.

### Côte d'Ivoire and the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

On 25 May, during consultations and under any other business, the Permanent Representative of France circulated a draft resolution concerning the technical roll-over of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) for a one-month period until 30 June 2010.

On 27 May, the Council adopted resolution 1924 (2010), by which it extended the mandate of UNOCI and the mandate of the French forces which support it for a one-month period until 30 June 2010.

## Asia

### Nepal and the United Nations Mission in Nepal

On 5 May, the Representative of the Secretary-General in Nepal and Head of the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), Karin Landgren, briefed the Council on the status of the peace process in Nepal and the work of UNMIN. The Permanent Representative of Nepal, Ambassador Gyan Chandra Acharya, participated in the briefing.

In the consultations of the whole which followed, Council members exchanged views on the peace process and the work of UNMIN. They called on all parties to continue their efforts to take the peace process forward and to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

On 12 May, in line with a request from the Government of Nepal, the Council adopted resolution 1921 (2010), by which it extended the mandate of UNMIN until 15 September 2010.

**The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question**

On 18 May, the Council heard a briefing by the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, Robert Serry, on recent developments in the region.

The Special Coordinator told the Council that the proximity talks had commenced and that their goal, as stated by the Quartet on 19 March in Moscow, was the resolution of all core issues, an end to the 1967 occupation, and two States living side by side in peace and security. He stressed the scale of the unmet needs of the Palestinian civilian population in Gaza and urged an end to the Israeli blockade of the Strip.

In the consultations of the whole that followed, members of the Council expressed support for the proximity talks. A number of members called on both parties not to engage in provocative acts and for an end to settlement activity. Many members expressed their grave concern at the humanitarian situation in Gaza, and called for the full implementation of resolution 1860 (2009). Some members called for the immediate opening of Gaza's border crossings.

On 31 May, at the request of Turkey and Lebanon, the Council held an emergency meeting on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question. During the meeting, the Council heard a briefing by the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Oscar Fernandez-Taranco, on the Israeli military operation against the convoy sailing to Gaza.

The Assistant Secretary-General told the Council that, on that same morning, Israeli forces had boarded a six-ship convoy that was sailing in the Mediterranean Sea en route to the Gaza Strip in an attempt to deliver humanitarian aid to Gaza and to break the Israeli blockade. He said that the Israeli navy had intercepted the convoy and that Israeli military personnel had boarded the vessels.

All 15 Council members spoke, including the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Ahmet Davutoğlu, who condemned the attack against the Gaza flotilla and demanded an urgent inquiry into the incident. A representative of Israel and the Permanent Observer of Palestine participated in the meeting and made statements.

In the extensive consultations of the whole that followed, members of the Council agreed on a presidential statement (S/PRST/2010/9), which was adopted in the early hours of 1 June 2010, under the Mexican presidency of the Security Council.

**Iraq and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq**

On 25 May, the Council heard a briefing by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq

(UNAMI), Ad Melkert, on recent developments in Iraq. The Permanent Representative of Iraq, Ambassador Hamid Al Bayati, also made a statement.

The Special Representative told the Council that UNAMI would encourage the main political parties to agree on three principles, namely, a Government coalition inclusive of all major winning lists; a Government based on power-sharing principles; and a Government-formation process within a tentatively agreed time frame. He updated the Council on the reconciliation efforts of UNAMI in Iraq, and specifically in the Province of Ninewa, where support for the protection of minorities should be strengthened. He shared with the Council his concern that signs of ambivalence seem to stand in the way of good relations with Kuwait. He also reported that UNAMI continued to call for the reaffirmation by Iraq of its border with Kuwait as an indispensable step towards resolving other outstanding issues. In that regard, he explained that the aim of exiting Chapter VII of the Charter is a point of consensus in Iraq.

In the consultations of the whole that followed, members of the Council commended the electoral commission of Iraq on the successful manual recount of ballots and the announcement of the outcome of the election in the Baghdad governorate. They also looked forward to the ratification of the overall election results by the Federal Supreme Court. Council members called for an inclusive political process to form as quickly as possible a Government, which reflected the will of the Iraqi people, and they condemned all acts of violence.

## Europe

### Kosovo

On 17 May, the Council held a debate on Kosovo. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), Lamberto Zannier, briefed the Council. He said that the situation in Kosovo remained stable, but that the potential remained for instability, especially in the north, and that the lack of significant progress in the reconciliation between the communities continued to be a challenge. He added that direct practical cooperation between Belgrade and Pristina would strengthen stability.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Serbia, Vuk Jeremić, and Skender Hyseni of Kosovo addressed the Council and provided their perspectives. Council members called upon Albanians and Serbs to enhance their mutual cooperation and to address their common challenges.

### Bosnia and Herzegovina

On 24 May, the Council held a debate on Bosnia and Herzegovina. The High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Valentin Inzko, briefed the Council. He outlined the progress achieved, including steps towards Euro-Atlantic integration, an agreement with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on a membership action plan, the destruction of unsafe ordnance left over from the civil war, and the progress on regional reconciliation.

The High Representative also spoke about the current and future challenges for Bosnia and Herzegovina and stated that the country remained afflicted by a lack of consensus about what sort of country it should or could be — whether a more

centralized or a decentralized State. The situation was exacerbated by an internal political split, a rise in the unemployment level, lack of constitutional reform and ethnic divisions. He called upon Bosnia and Herzegovina to respect the Dayton Agreement and to foster a constructive atmosphere of reform. Finally, he praised the continuing commitment of the European Union to accompanying the country on the path to stability.

The Chairman of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Haris Silajdžić, addressed the Council and attributed the lack of domestic progress to the so-called entity voting mechanism and to violations of the Dayton Peace Agreement.

Following the briefings, Council members welcomed the progress achieved by Bosnia and Herzegovina in the international and regional spheres and urged all parties in the country to strengthen internal dialogue and cooperation, in order to achieve genuine reconciliation and make further progress on police reform, internal unity and multi-ethnic stability. Most Council members also voiced support for international assistance to strengthen security and rule-of-law institutions, while calling on all leaders to refrain from anti-Dayton rhetoric.

## Thematic and general issues

### Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations: European Union

On 4 May, the Council held a briefing on cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations (European Union), during which the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the European Union, Baroness Catherine Ashton, briefed the Council on the European Union's commitment to active partnership in promoting peace, security, justice and human rights, protecting the vulnerable and helping people to live in safety and dignity.

The High Representative noted that the new Treaty of Lisbon allowed the European Union to expand its support for United Nations programmes, initiatives and efforts in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. She also noted that the struggle against impunity remained a key factor in peacebuilding and conflict prevention.

Following the briefing, Council members welcomed the European Union's contributions to capacity-building in Africa and expressed their support for the cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional entities, as enshrined in Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. They also expressed their view that the maintenance of international peace and security remained a paramount responsibility of the Security Council.

Council members welcomed European Union support for the United Nations efforts in maintaining international peace and security, since the two organizations shared common goals and purposes, such as the promotion of human rights, the rule of law and development.

### Briefings by the Chairmen of the counter-terrorism Committees

On 11 May, the Council held an open debate and received updates from the Chairmen of three Committees: the Committee established pursuant to resolution

1267 (1999) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities; the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism; and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) concerning weapons of mass destruction.

The Permanent Representative of Mexico, Ambassador Claude Heller, delivered a joint statement on behalf of the three Committees and said that the Committees and their expert groups had increased their cooperation and coordination during the previous six months. He also said that the three expert groups had continued to implement a common strategy on dealing with non- or late-reporting States and in assisting Member States in submitting their responses to the three Committees on their implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions.

In his statement as Chairman of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), Ambassador Heller said that resolution 1540 (2004) had prompted significant action across the globe; nearly 160 States had reported on their capabilities and the challenges in preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. He added that some countries had reported on the legal measures they had taken to counter non-State traffic in such weapons, while others had reported on gaps in their legal regimes.

The Permanent Representative of Austria and Chairman of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999), Ambassador Thomas Mayr-Harting, reported on methods to update the listing and de-listing of individuals and entities, in accordance with the directives contained in Council resolutions 1822 (2008) and 1904 (2009), to ensure that the consolidated list remained dynamic and reflected current threats. He also described the establishment of the Office of the Ombudsperson, where listed entities and individuals could present their cases, as an important step towards fairness and transparency in the regime. He said that the Committee was committed to improving its procedures in the interest of both effectiveness and human rights.

The Permanent Representative of Turkey and Chairman of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001), Ambassador Ertuğrul Apakan said that that Committee adopted a strategic and transparent approach in its deliberations and working methods. The Committee had taken up issues such as border control and security, implementation and assessment of resolution 1624 (2005), maritime security and terrorist acts committed at sea, implementation of extradition requirements and law enforcement. He said that the Committee was working on policy guidance on international legal cooperation and was improving transparency. It was also increasing dialogue with Member States to identify areas where the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) was lagging.

Following the briefings, Council members and representatives of participating States stressed the continued need for a unified, global fight against terrorism and welcomed efforts to make the Council's three Committees more effective, coordinated and transparent. The participants also called on the Committees to increase their briefings to Member States; to work towards the elimination of tension, occupation and injustice; and to do away with double standards in resolutions. They stressed the need for further technical assistance and funding mechanisms to help them comply with their obligations under counter-terrorism resolutions.

**Maintenance of international peace and security: intercultural dialogue for peace and security**

On 26 May, the Council held a briefing on the theme "Intercultural dialogue for peace and security" under the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security". The briefing was based on a concept paper (S/2010/248, annex), in which intercultural dialogue for peace and security was presented as an instrument of preventive diplomacy, conflict management and resolution, and peacebuilding.

The meeting was chaired by the President of the Council of Ministers of Lebanon, Saad Hariri, who made an opening statement. He said that while difficulties had tested his country and people, their will to live together had not been shaken. He added that Lebanon was enriched by its diversity, openness and partnership between Christians and Muslims. He stressed that the need for dialogue among people of different faiths and cultures was far greater today in the light of the dangers that might result from policies based on fear and threats. He said that the spirit of justice and respect for international law must prevail for authentic dialogue to occur, and added, as an example, that a durable and just peace in Palestine would have substantial influence over relations between cultures and religions.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations described intercultural dialogue as an important topic for Lebanon and all Member States on the eve of the third Forum of the Alliance of Civilizations, which would begin on 28 May in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. He said that dialogue helped to defuse tension, promoted reconciliation in the aftermath of conflict and introduced moderate voices into polarized debates. He emphasized the need to protect cultural diversity and to strengthen educational systems so that young people could benefit from cultural diversity and not be victimized by those who exploited differences.

Council members, including the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, Alistair Burt, stressed that intercultural dialogue was important in a globalized world and that the Security Council must take into account the cultural aspect of conflicts. They also welcomed the various international platforms for dialogue, stressed that extremism is fomented by distorted views of other cultures and emphasized that tolerance and mutual respect should be the basis for the international community to confront challenges. Some members noted the role of mediation, which required deep cultural knowledge, as an important tool for the resolution and prevention of conflicts. They also underlined the importance of intercultural dialogue in building respect between peoples and overcoming mistrust among them.

**United Nations peacekeeping operations**

On 27 May, the Council held consultations on United Nations peacekeeping operations, during which the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Alain Le Roy, and the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, Susana Malcorra, made introductory remarks on peacekeeping operations and later engaged in an interactive discussion with Council members.

The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations described the challenges in the field, including the need to have an exit strategy from the start of any United Nations intervention, the high vacancy rate in peacekeeping missions and the centralized chain of command. He informed the Council that a strategy on

early peacebuilding would be developed by the end of the year. He also stressed the importance of maintaining a favourable public opinion of a peacekeeping operation, to secure the consent of the host country.

The Under-Secretary-General for Field Support said that striking a "dual work" balance was consuming many resources, since the United Nations would have to work as if a mission were there for the long term, while commencing preparations for its liquidation. She argued for enhanced Secretariat engagement with Member States in appointing senior peacekeeping operation personnel and for the improvement of rosters.

Several Council members stressed the need for utilizing the gap lists, the need for feedback from the field and the need for interactive discussions on mission-oriented issues.

**Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea**

In closed consultations on 27 May, the Chairman of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), Ambassador Ertuğrul Apakan of Turkey, briefed the Council on the activities of the Committee from 12 February to 27 May 2010. He said that, during the reporting period, the Panel of Experts had submitted its final report to the Security Council. He also said that the Committee had received one report of an alleged case of violation of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009). Lastly, he informed the Council that the mandate of the Panel would expire on 12 June.

In the discussions that followed, Council members noted the reported violations with concern and expressed their support for the renewal of the mandate of the Panel of Experts.

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**General Assembly**
**Sixty-fourth session**
Agenda items 10 and 33

**Security Council**
**Sixty-fifth year**

**Report of the Peacebuilding Commission**

**Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects**

## Letter dated 22 July 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Permanent Mission of Portugal to the United Nations recently organized a seminar in Portugal on peacekeeping and peacebuilding, in which 26 representatives of Member States participated. We were also privileged to be able to count on the participation of Atul Khare, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations; Luis Carrilho, United Nations Police Commissioner, United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste; and Antero Lopes, Chief of Security Sector Reform, United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau. In addition, Victor Angelo, until recently your Special Representative to the Central African Republic and Chad, brought to our discussions his vast experience and particular knowledge of United Nations operations. I am attaching a list of the participants (see annex I) as well as the concept paper we prepared for the seminar (see annex II). We had very candid and open discussions, during which a number of interesting views and suggestions came up.

I am writing to you to also transmit, at the request of the participants of the seminar, and on my own responsibility, a summary of the proceedings and of the main conclusions of our meetings (see annex I). The representatives of the Member States that participated in the seminar considered that such a document should be brought to your attention and should be shared with the wider membership, entrusting me with proceeding accordingly.

I thus have the honour to request that the present letter and its annexes be circulated as a document of the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly, under agenda items 10 and 33, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) José Filipe de **Moraes Cabral**
Ambassador

10-46245 (E) 020810

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## Annex I to the letter dated 22 July 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

### Seminar

### United Nations peacekeeping and peacebuilding: enhancing interaction between the Security Council, the Secretariat, troop- and police-contributing countries and host countries

Portugal, 8 to 10 July 2010

### List of participants

7 July 2010

Atul Khare, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations

Ambassador Abulkalam Abdul Momen (Bangladesh)

Mrs. Mirsada Colakovic, Deputy Permanent Representative (Bosnia and Herzegovina)

Ambassador Michel Kafando (Burkina Faso)

Ambassador Kosal Sea (Cambodia)

Ambassador Antonio Pedro Lima (Cape Verde)

Ambassador Fernand Poukré-Kono (Central African Republic)

Mr. Mohammed Edrees, Deputy Permanent Representative (Egypt)

Mr. Reta Alemu Nega, Deputy Permanent Representative (Ethiopia)

Ambassador Peter William Thomson (Fiji)

Ambassador Jarmo Viinanen (Finland)

Coronel Enusah Abdulai, Minister-Consellor Military Adviser (Ghana)

Ambassador Jean Wesley Cazeau, Deputy Permanent Representative (Haiti)

Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri (India)

Ambassador Anne Anderson (Ireland)

Mr. Khalid Shawabkah, Chargé d'affaires (Jordan)

Ambassador Motlatsi Ramafole (Lesotho)

Ambassador Brian Bowler (Malawi)

Ambassador Daniel António (Mozambique)

Ambassador Mohammed Loulichki (Morocco)

Ambassador Libran Cabactulan (Philippines)

Mrs. Rona Meleisea, Deputy Permanent Representative (Samoa)

Ambassador Shekou Touray (Sierra Leone)

Ambassador Baso Sangqu (South Africa)

Ambassador Palitha Kohona (Sri Lanka)

Ambassador Kodjo Menan (Togo)

Ambassador Ghazi Jomaa (Tunisia)

**Special guests**

Mr. Victor Ângelo, Former Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the Central African Republic and Chad

Mr. Luis Carrilho, United Nations Police Commissioner, United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste

Mr. Antero Lopes, Chief Security Sector Reform, United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau

## Summary

1. The three main themes discussed were the following:

(a) The articulation between peacekeeping and peacebuilding;

(b) The issue of ownership;

(c) Improving the capacity of the Secretariat.

## 1. Peacekeeping and peacebuilding

2. There was a wide consensus that peacekeeping and peacebuilding should go hand-in-hand, namely, that planning for peacekeeping should already include elements of peacebuilding even if the initial priority should be given to the stabilization and security dimensions of the mission, which are paramount. Peacekeepers are early peacebuilders. Nevertheless, in certain situations, the lack of a secure environment prevents peacebuilding activities from being pursued. Peacekeeping and peacebuilding should be addressed in a comprehensive way and the United Nations should act in a timely manner and draw from previous experiences.

3. Peacebuilding operations can only be conducted with any degree of success if they are based on a full understanding of the root causes of the conflict, of the realities on the ground and of the regional environment, and if they address these issues in an efficient way. There is no "one size fits all"; a case-by-case approach is essential. Before determining the mandate, intensive consultation should be conducted in order to ascertain those realities and the expectations of the authorities of the host country in a way that reinforces the political will of the host country to consolidate peace. A continuous dialogue and interaction with national authorities (as with civil society, women and youth groups) during the whole life cycle of the mission is in this sense fundamental, as is the involvement of regional and subregional organizations and the support of neighbouring countries, which can be decisive in many cases.

4. There is a need to improve coordination among United Nations bodies in order to ensure a smooth transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, including coherence between peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts, and to reinforce the

conditions to carry out mandates. The Security Council and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which are at the centre of peacekeeping operations, must reach out in a genuine and effective way to other bodies, agencies and programmes, which are essential in order to conduct efficient peacebuilding, which has a very distinct nature from the more "military" dimension of peacekeeping. An "umbrella process" is needed, one which would bring together, in a coordinated way, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Peacebuilding Commission, the Secretariat (the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Political Affairs), the United Nations Development Programme and other agencies and programmes. Coordination with troop-contributing countries and police-contributing countries should also be reinforced from the outset, during the duration of the mission and in the preparations for exit strategies. Forecasting is essential for troop-contributing countries and police-contributing countries. More work on the ground and a more efficient role for the Secretariat were underlined, as were the need for adequate resources and capacities for missions in order to enable them to meet the challenges they face.

## 2. Ownership

5. Close consultation and coordination with the authorities of the host country, before and during the term of the mandate, are a prerequisite to reinforce ownership by the country and its political will, and ultimately to ensure the conditions for the success of the mission. As already mentioned, these conditions could be further strengthened by the permanent involvement of regional and subregional organizations, as well as by the support of neighbouring countries.

6. Despite its conceptual and political difficulties, some form of "dual ownership" of missions was mentioned as being necessary in order to prevent situations where a host country decides on an untimely end of the mission before the objectives of the mandate have been fulfilled, especially when such decisions may have negative consequences in neighbouring countries. The negative effects of such decisions on troop- and police-contributing countries, in particular in their availability to participate in future missions, was also underlined. These situations call for an increased dialogue and consultation between the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries, in order to ensure a smooth transition and to manage the expectations of contributing countries in an effective way.

7. The strengthening of an effective and efficient dialogue between the Security Council and its members, the Secretariat, regional and subregional organizations and the host country constitutes an important element in preventing such situations and in developing the "national responsibility" of the host country in line with its ownership. This dialogue should focus on the nature of the mandate, time frames, goals, benchmarks, evaluation and exit strategies, and aim at constantly reinforcing national ownership, while defining some form of contract or memorandum of understanding between the United Nations and the host country. It was nevertheless recognized that the improvement of interaction in this area could not, by itself, prevent a sudden change of will on behalf of the host country.

8. An adequate management of expectations of the host country is essential, namely in the context of the evolution of political situations that can affect the justification for the peacekeeping operation, especially if the objectives of the mission are not being fulfilled. Mandates should be adaptable to these changes.

9. There is a need for a new generation of mandates, based on realistic assessments of conditions on the ground, of expectations of the host authorities, of available resources, adequate time frames and comprehensive exit strategies. These issues should be discussed from the outset and should contribute towards a concomitant responsibility of the international community and the host country, based on clear commitments from each side.

10. In this context, a new methodology on approving mandates was suggested, comprising three successive phases: a principled decision of the Security Council (already based on consultations with the host country), followed by a period in which the Secretariat would evaluate the situation, decide on resources needed and discuss with troop- and police-contributing countries, which would in turn lead to the definitive decision of the Security Council. Such a compact would bring together all the relevant players and contribute to create more efficient conditions to carry out the mission.

### 3. Improving the capacity of the Secretariat

11. To enhance the efficiency and credibility of the United Nations, it is necessary to improve the capacity of the Secretariat, namely in terms of its articulation with the Security Council, the Peacebuilding Commission, troop- and police-contributing countries and host countries, as well as with regional and subregional organizations, in order to establish better mandates with clearer tasks and more attainable goals. The Secretariat should also promote a more active South-South cooperation in support of these goals. These issues had already, to some extent, been addressed during the discussions on the previous items.

12. There is also a strong need for the Secretariat to be able to anticipate situations and advise the Security Council in a timely way, in line with the responsibility of the Secretariat to pre-empt developments that undermine peace and international security. With this objective, departments of the Secretariat (namely, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Political Affairs) should coordinate themselves in a more efficient way as well as reach out effectively to other bodies in the United Nations family, developing an "early warning" capacity in terms of conflict prevention; the advice and particular insight of regional and subregional organizations in concrete situations would be of significant value in this context.

13. The quality of the interaction between the Secretariat and the Security Council should also be improved. Not that there is any doubt about the integrity and thoroughness of the Secretariat, but a need is felt for the Secretariat to place itself above and beyond conjuncture and the immediate concerns of Security Council members and their positions as well as in promoting more substantial debates.

14. As already mentioned, the Secretariat must convey to the Council what it has to hear and not necessarily what it wants to hear. Likewise, the articulation between the Secretariat and the Peacebuilding Commission and the country configurations should be improved, making way for more coherent approaches, guidelines and orientations. In the case of special political missions more frequent reporting to and debate in the Security Council were considered essential, in line with the timetables laid out for peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions.

15. Concerning mandates, a need for a more comprehensive approach, including both the peacekeeping and peacebuilding dimensions, was underlined. It was felt that present mandates were too large, with too many key tasks, whereas a more focused approach, with clear benchmarks as well as consistent exit strategies, based on indicators that underline progress made and its sustainability, were deemed necessary. As mentioned before, the role of regional and subregional organizations as well as of neighbouring countries — that presently has not gone far beyond a theoretical dimension — would contribute to strengthening the contents of mandates and allow for their more efficient implementation, through the development of useful synergies.

16. The Secretariat should also discuss from the beginning with host countries their concept of ownership and their views on military and police components, both being crucial for the success of the mission. It was underlined that perceived shifts of commitment on behalf of the international community were detrimental to the aims of the missions, sending negative signals to host countries.

17. The choice of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to lead the mission was considered an important element for its success. More attention should also be given to cooperation between neighbouring missions, drawing on their respective experience and helping to solve cross-border problems.

18. Finally, in order to mobilize support for the mission, an informal "group of friends" was considered a useful instrument, as well as closer informal cooperation in New York between troop- and police-contributing countries.

## Annex II to the letter dated 22 July 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

**Seminar**

**United Nations peacekeeping and peacebuilding: enhancing interaction between the Security Council, the Secretariat, troop- and police-contributing countries and host countries**

Portugal, 8 to 10 July 2010

### Framework note for discussion

1. With over 100,000 peacekeepers deployed across the world, peacekeeping is today a major United Nations activity and represents a huge challenge both in terms of ensuring that all its tasks are fulfilled and that missions are provided with the field support they need.

2. The growing complexity and the diversity of mission-mandated tasks demand an integrated approach to United Nations peacekeeping. Peacekeeping and peacebuilding are no longer to be seen as sequential activities. Today, they are viewed and implemented in an integrated way. This change in the mindset presents a strong challenge right from the planning phase of peacekeeping activities in order to ensure, from that phase onwards, both peacekeeping effectiveness and the foundations for sustainable peace and development.

3. As a troop- and police-contributing country to United Nations peacekeeping operations for more than 20 years, Portugal, like many other contributing countries, fully understands the importance of peacebuilding efforts being considered at the early stage of peacekeeping operations. It is also aware that such efforts should be carried out persistently throughout the life cycle of a mission. Clear mandates can facilitate the implementation of early peacebuilding strategies in peacekeeping operations, which will allow for a responsible transition and, when the time comes, an adequate exit strategy.

4. There is no "one size fits all" solution since each mission is different. Nevertheless, there are peacebuilding "foundations" that should already be present in the early stages of a peacekeeping mission. Security sector reform, rule of law and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration or, in the economic area, relaunching the economy, are some of the "traditional" peacebuilding activities that could be present at an early phase of a peacekeeping operation, side by side with the core peacekeeping tasks to be undertaken. Once a security environment has been fully ensured and the basic institutions and foundations for sustainable development are set, it would then be possible to develop further peacebuilding activities.

5. The planning phase of peacekeeping activities is crucial to a mission's success and represents a challenge in terms of establishing the capacities needed and the goals to be achieved according to the specific situation. In order to overcome that challenge it is important that the Secretariat look into the troop-contributing/police-contributing country's experience and expertise and listen to their advice in a timely

manner through appropriate interaction. This will assist in the establishment of the military and police tasks, operational concepts and command and control structure and help to ensure that the needed capacities will be provided.

6. Not having the capacities to meet the demands required by the situation may result in a longer and delayed process to achieve the desired end result or, at the extreme, a mission failure that may affect United Nations peacekeeping credibility as a whole. Secretariat consultations with troop-contributing/police-contributing countries should not only be considered in the planning phase but throughout a mission's life cycle, in order to readjust tasks according to the changes that may occur on the ground. At the same time, such readjustments and the review of mandate tasks require close cooperation between the Security Council and the troop-contributing/police-contributing countries.

7. Also essential when developing early peacebuilding (as well as in peacekeeping) is ensuring an integrated and coordinated approach by the relevant departments of the Secretariat (the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Peacebuilding Support Office, the Department of Political Affairs and the United Nations funds) and non-United Nations partners, thus paving the way for a smooth development of national capacity, economic revitalization and the generation of employment.

8. Naturally, none of these peacebuilding efforts can work properly and effectively without the full involvement and commitment of the host country in a process of responsible ownership.

9. United Nations peacekeeping and peacebuilding is a broad and complex theme. The seminar, however, is intended to focus the participants' discussion on the following areas: identification of peacebuilding activities that could be developed at the early stages of a mission; and ideas on ways to improve cooperation between the Security Council, the Secretariat and the troop-contributing/police-contributing countries in order for the experience in the field to be better reflected in Security Council mandates, resulting in clearer tasks and more attainable goals.

10. Being the main "actor" in establishing the mandated tasks, the Security Council should strive to improve these consultations with the troop-contributing/police-contributing countries. In this regard — it should be underlined — important developments are to be credited to the Council. The framework of cooperation is set: it was established by resolution 1353 (2001) and the presidential statement of 2009 (S/PRST/2009/24). Still it should be fully implemented and further developed. The recent meetings of the Council concerning post-conflict peacebuilding and on the theme "United Nations peacekeeping operations: transition and exit strategies", also produced important presidential statements and debates. However, much more can be done.

11. Interaction between troop-contributing/police-contributing countries and the Security Council should be strengthened, not only in formal meetings of the Council. Such interaction would be more useful if the Security Council could use the innovative practice of the so-called "informal interactive dialogues" and to include in the debate, at the earliest stage possible, the views of interested States. The views of contributing countries can only help and benefit the Council in devising the necessary elements of a mission's mandates. Their views should also be invited at the early stage of the negotiations on draft resolutions regarding the

establishment and review of a mission's mandates. Cooperation with the Secretariat in this regard is fundamental, in particular in exchanging information on planning activities and making sure that reports are disseminated early enough, both to Council members and contributing countries.

12. Finally, cooperation between the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission should be increased. The Council's interaction with the chairs of the Peacebuilding Commission and, in particular, Peacebuilding Commission country-specific configurations should be improved, not only in the formal meetings of the Security Council, but also by inviting the chairs of the country-specific configurations to participate in informal consultations (or any suitable informal setting, such as informal interactive dialogues), where their inputs may prove to be particularly useful. Moreover, regular meetings and close contacts between Council presidencies and chairs of the Peacebuilding Commission on situations of mutual concern should be encouraged, bearing in mind the importance, as recognized by the Council, of early consideration of peacebuilding in Council deliberations.

13. An important and dynamic reflection is ongoing in the United Nations on these issues, which is stimulated by the important studies conducted by the Secretariat and is reflected in the report "A new partnership agenda: charting a new horizon for United Nations Peacekeeping". The Security Council remains, naturally, at the centre of this reflection, and a review of progress in this area is also expected later in 2010, following the presidential statement issued in February 2010 (S/PRST/2010/2).

14. Possible topics for discussion:

- Peacekeeping/peacebuilding integration: peacebuilding activities that can usefully be developed during the early stages of a peacekeeping mission. Core elements or areas to be included in peacekeeping mandates to facilitate early peacebuilding tasks.
- Peacekeepers as peacebuilders? New role for peacekeepers?
- Improving Security Council interaction with troop-contributing/police-contributing countries: more informal, more frequent, more useful.
- Role of the Secretariat in helping to strengthen the interaction of the Security Council with troop-contributing/police-contributing countries and their involvement in planning activities: early cooperation and dissemination of information to the Security Council and contributing countries.
- Better interaction of the Security Council with the Peacebuilding Commission, including with the chairs of country-specific configurations.